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1. INTRODUCTION
Rym Ayadi, Frank Lierman and Morten Balling
On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum co-
organized a conference “Crisis management at cross-roads” in Brussels. All
papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the
SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.
In Chapter 2, Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability, Bank of England
gives an overview of the various components of crisis management packages:
1) Central bank liquidity insurance: Discount window lending against wide col-
lateral, 2) Market Maker of Last Resort? 3) Recovery plans and contingent cap-
ital and 4) Resolution and support operations. The instruments on the crisis man-
agement menu are interlinked. The author finds it very important to find ways of
distributing the costs of official sector support operations back to the system and
its uninsured creditors rather than to the general taxpayer. If that can be achieved,
market discipline will be enhanced.
The first session on “Provision of liquidity and lender of last resort operations:
effectiveness, governance, cross-border and cross-currency issues”, contained
interventions by Johan Evenepoel, Global Head of Treasury, Dexia Group, who
in Chapter 3 describes how the group had re-organized liquidity management as
a reaction to the financial crisis. Before the crisis, there was decentralized liquidity
management but with a centralized follow up at the group level. During the crisis
it became clear that the Treasury had to be re-organized completely. The disrup-
tion of the interbank market made it necessary to introduce a new classification
of available securities for use during stress situations. A common database of all
securities within the group was established and competence centres concerning
central bank eligibility criteria were implemented. The group reacted to the dis-
ruption of the FX-market by implementing limits on individual currency/time
zones and on the consolidated level. In the new organization, a Treasury Manage-
ment Centre decides on market access principles, pricing and positions for all
currencies supported by competence centres and local treasuries. The new organ-
ization makes it possible to optimize cross-border use of liquidity within the
group.
In Chapter 4, Francesco Papadia, European Central Bank, examines fluctuations
in the EuriborEonia swap rate spread from early 2007 to late 2009, using a mod-
ified traffic light metaphor to distinguish between periods with different levels of
market turmoil. The months prior to September 2007 were characterised as a
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‘green light period’ with modest volatility. Referring to the limited activity of the
ECB in the money market, Mr. Papadia remarked that “life was rather boring in
Kaiserstrasse”. From September 2007 to January 2008 there was a ‘yellow light
period’. From January 2008 to September the colour was orange, and from Octo-
ber 2008 starting with the Lehman Brothers collapse until May 2009 the market
participants experienced a ‘red light period’, where volatilities reached unprece-
dented heights. Since May 2009, the appropriate colour has once again reverted
to orange. Mr. Papadia also describes the ECB’s money market operations and the
adjustments of the lending facilities. Particularly during the ‘red light period’, the
ECB carried out very big liquidity operations. Life was no longer ‘boring in Kai-
serstrasse’, with a motto of ‘letting the banks get the liquidity they want’. As a
consequence, the ECB balance sheet showed very large increases in deposits from
banks and lending to banks. The ECB became a money market intermediary at a
very large scale. Operations took place not only in Euro but in other currencies
as well. Thus, the ECB balance sheet not only grew, it became also more compli-
cated. The speaker said that the ECB in some periods operated as “the 13th dis-
trict of the Federal Reserve System”. After the move back to the ‘yellow period’
in the autumn of 2009, interest rate volatility subsided and the ECB balance sheet
declined again. The morale of the dramatic development is that ECB has to
recourse to exceptional action during exceptional circumstances.
Also in the session, Garry Schinasi, visiting fellow at Bruegel on sabbatical from
International Monetary Fund, provided what he called a ‘helicopter view’ of cen-
tral bank reactions to the financial crisis. The speaker used a so-called scorecard
to summarize his judgment of the effectiveness of central bank policies regarding
liquidity provision and in their role as lenders of last resort. Liquidity policies had
been effective in reducing goods price inflation, and as lenders of last resort, cen-
tral banks had been effective in pulling us back from the abyss. Neither of the two
approaches had been effective in solving cross-border problems. Central banks
had in the view of the speaker insufficient tools to ensure stability through liquid-
ity provision and there had been weaknesses in both micro- and macro prudential
policy design and implementation. Risk management systems had failed to keep
up. On the other hand, both the Federal Reserve System and the ECB had per-
formed relatively well during the crisis considering the instruments they had. The
Long Term Capital Collapse should have been understood as an early wake-up
call and the authorities could have acted long time ago. According to the speaker,
it is – however – a dream that we can develop an early warning system that can
prevent all new crises in the future. Prevention will never work fully. Central
banks must therefore demand resolution procedures. Systemic important finan-
cial institutions must be monitored closely and they must be obliged to prepare
their own resolution procedures. A global economy needs global governance.
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National policies are suboptimal. So, Mr. Schinasi welcomed the recent G20 ini-
tiatives for stronger international coordination.
In Chapter 5, Freddy Van den Spiegel, BNP Paribas Fortis Bank, points out in his
introduction to Session 2 “Cross-border bank resolution” that in an integrated
European financial market, it is essential that the legal framework for Central
Bank resolution plans should be fully harmonized. The author argues that the
development of a clear framework for managing financial crises at the EU level is
very important. The EU strives for a completely open internal market and the EU
has political procedures at its disposal which do not exist at the global level. Its
attainment remains, however, a delicate issue because of the potential conse-
quences for Government budgets and the society as a whole. Each crisis is a sur-
prise for which there is no tailor-made script. The author concludes that selective
harmonisation of the tools and powers of supervisory authorities in the Member
states and stricter coordination of supervision and crisis management at the EU
level must be implemented.
Also in Session 2, Daniel Gros, Director, CEPS, looked at the task of Europe.
Many seem to think that cross-border banks can not go into failure. But, failures
must become possible in normal times – also failures of banks with cross-border
operations. Of course, efforts should be made to reduce the costs of cross-border
failures. Regulation must be adapted. The EU Directive on winding-up of failed
financial institutions applies up to now only to subsidiaries. Supervisory author-
ities should be allowed to treat also subsidiaries as branches when they request
contingency planning by the subsidiaries and be authorized to say: if contingency
planning is not in place, we will consider you as a branch. The need for a Euro-
pean Deposit Guarantee Scheme is very clear. If such a scheme had been in place,
it could have saved Iceland.
In Chapter 6, Ingimundur Fridriksson, former Governor of the Central Bank of
Iceland, explains the background of the collapse of the Icelandic banks. The Ice-
landic banks had easy access to global bond markets and they used it to expand
their balance sheets to levels that were not sustainable. When the crisis hit, they
did not have a sufficiently strong home base. The banking crisis called for cross-
border cooperation, but it turned out that Iceland found it difficult to forge alli-
ances with foreign authorities to help in the resolution of the problems.
In Chapter 7, Peter Praet and Gregory Nguyen, National Bank of Belgium look
at some avenues for reinforcing the crisis resolution framework in Europe. They
argue for convergence of authorities’ toolkits, which may be a precondition for
burden-sharing. Improvements in cooperation procedures in normal times should
focus on information exchange. Improvements in cooperation procedures in crisis
times should address information exchange, assessment, fair implementation of
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crisis resolution plans, and time management. Improvement is going to be a long
and difficult process, requiring consistency and determination.
Chapter 8 is a summary of conference contributions by Charles Goodhart,
Philipp Hartmann and Dirk Schoenmaker concerning the limits to the ‘Lender of
last resort’, ‘Too big to fail’ and ‘Too big to save’ theses. Charles Goodhart, Emer-
itus Professor, London School of Economics focussed on the limits of the Lender
of last resort concept. During the crisis, the relative importance of systemic
important banks has increased. Philipp Hartmann, SUERF and ECB pointed out
that there are different notions of the Lender of Last Resort Concept. National
central banks, treasuries and international institutions can all potentially be
called upon to provide support to financial institutions in distress. Limits to sup-
port may be explained by concerns for moral hazard, burdens on future genera-
tions and competition policy considerations. Dirk Schoenmaker,  Duisenberg
School of Finance discussed the idea to break up big banks and create several
small banks in stead. The implications would probably be loss of economies of
scale and scope and loss of credit risk diversification.
Chapter 9 is a summary of conference contributions by Hans Groeneveld, Maria
J. Nieto, Dirk Cupei, Doris Kolassa and Robert Priester under the headline
“Deposit guarantee schemes: How to re-establish clients’ confidence.” Hans
Groeneveld,  Rabobank Nederland, argued that deposit guarantee schemes
should not be considered as crisis management instruments but as financial safety
nets for incidental small bank insolvencies. The main objective was to safeguard
the confidence of small savers in the stability of the financial system. Maria J.
Nieto, Banco de España, described deposit insurance as the neglected dimension
of the EU safety net. EU policy makers have largely neglected the interrelation
between deposit insurance and prudential supervision and reorganization and
winding up procedures. Dirk Cupei, European Forum of Deposit Insurers, argued
that although existing insurance schemes for many years had contributed posi-
tively to the financial safety net, they could be improved in several ways. Doris
Kolassa, European Commission, explains that deposit guarantee schemes should
not be dealt with in isolation but as part of a broader financial safety system
including capital adequacy requirements, financial supervision, consumer protec-
tion and procedures for resolution of financial institutions in distress. In an EU
with 27 member states with very different deposit guarantee schemes, the Com-
mission will probably continue to be a strong voice for more harmonization
Robert Priester, European Banking Federation, said that deposit guarantee
schemes should act against contagion, enhance consumers’ awareness and ensure
an equal level of depositor protection across Europe.
Chapter 10 contains a paper by Rosa Maria Lastra, Professor of International
Financial and Monetary Law at the Centre for Commerical Law Studies, Queen
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Mary, University of London and Rym Ayadi, Head of the Financial Institutions
and Prudential Policy Unit, CEPS. The two authors explore the limitations of
deposit guarantee schemes in the context of the overall safety net arrangements
in Europe and propose concrete avenues for reforms. The authors provide an
overview of the deposit guarantee literature and analyze the differences between
explicit and implicit deposit insurance, the status of ‘preferred creditors’ and the
mandatory nature of deposit insurance. They suggest that a single market in
financial services requires a European solution with regard to deposit insurance.
Europe needs better regulation, better supervision and better crisis management
on a cross-border basis.
Chapter 11 is the Closing speech by Guy Quaden, Governor, National Bank of
Belgium. The Governor observes that the various crisis measures appear to have
achieved their objectives and that crisis prevention will therefore soon have to
take over from crisis management. This will require both a timely exit from the
exceptional measures taken to stabilise the financial system and the economy, and
the implementation of fundamental reforms to remedy the structural defects
exposed by the crisis. The Governor expresses his strong support to the recent
proposal to set up, at the EU level, a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and
a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), which are called upon to
cooperate closely in order to bring more comprehensiveness and consistency to
national and international supervision.
Chapter 12 is the 2009 SUERF Annual Lecture “Unconventional monetary poli-
cies and crisis management” by Jaime Caruana, General Manager, Bank for Inter-
national Settlements in Basel. Unconventional monetary policies can be defined
as the elevation of liquidity management operations from a passive role in the
background, undertaken simply to ensure the attainment of the interest rate tar-
get in normal times, to an active role to influence broader financial conditions. It
is unconventional when the underlying aim of intervention is to support market
functioning by restoring both funding and market liquidity and thereby to shore
up confidence in the financial system as a whole. It is a big challenge how to
properly judge the timing and pace of the exit. Unconventional monetary policies
can not substitute for the required fundamental restructuring of private sector
balance sheets and the application of better business models.
SUERF2010.book  Page 11  Monday, March 22, 2010  3:04 PMSUERF2010.book  Page 12  Monday, March 22, 2010  3:04 PM13
larcier
2. THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT MENU
Paul Tucker
It is a great pleasure to be here today. The current crisis has thrown up so many
lessons in so many dimensions of the ‘rules of the game’ for the financial system,
that I congratulate the organisers on devoting a whole conference to crisis man-
agement. That in itself is a meaty enterprise. But a vital one.
By way of setting the scene for today’s conference, I will offer the Bank of Eng-
land’s perspective on the various components of a crisis management package:
central bank liquidity insurance for viable firms and markets; firm recovery plans,
and contingent capital; resolution plans for winding down failed businesses,
including payouts from deposit-insurance regimes; and official-sector support
operations, including emergency liquidity assistance and Capital of Last Resort.
Every country’s authorities need a policy on each of these components, because
some day in the future our successors will find that, however good, the improve-
ments our generation makes in the structure, regulation and supervision of the
financial system will let them down.
A thread that runs through the discussion is how to preserve the core financial
services provided to the economy through periods of extreme stress without bail-
ing out banks’ equity holders or uninsured wholesale creditors. That is the
essence of the “Too Big/Important To Fail” debate. It is not so much that the top
management of banks consciously swing for the fences, but rather that wholesale
credit may be systematically too cheap for banks, and perhaps other intermediar-
ies too, unless the usual market disciplines of failure can apply. The international
community is, rightly, increasingly focused on this. And, in particular, it is good
news that the G20 Finance Ministers and Governors have asked the Financial
Stability Board to pursue it. To quote the theme of this conference, ‘TBTF’ is
probably the definitive Cross-Roads issue.
2.1. CENTRAL BANK LIQUIDITY INSURANCE: DISCOUNT 
WINDOW LENDING AGAINST WIDE COLLATERAL
I shall begin with the central banker’s role as lender of last resort, the one area
where there was quite a lot of thinking ahead of this current crisis.
Even so, one of the things many central banks, including the Bank of England,
confronted over the past two years or so was that, when conditions are bad
enough, the central bank will inevitably lend to solvent and viable firms against
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a very wide range of collateral. Since we will end up doing so, it is wise to
acknowledge that in advance. But, crucially, it is also wise to set the terms so as
to avoid subsidising or encouraging imprudent liquidity management by firms in
normal circumstances. That is one of the principles which underpin the Bank of
England’s own new, permanent liquidity facilities introduced just over a year ago.
The other principles are that:
– our liquidity insurance should absolutely not cut across monetary policy;
– in lending against a wide class of collateral, the central bank must apply
appropriate haircuts, and must be capable of valuing the assets and of man-
aging them in the event of a counterparty default. Our haircuts are published
and include various add-ons for particular risks. And the underlying assets
accepted as collateral should have a viable underlying market;
– as a means of effecting the delivery of insurance, secured loans (repo or col-
lateral swaps) are preferable in most circumstances to outright purchases, as
during the life of a loan central banks can update the value of the security, the
collateral margins and other terms that control the risk to them;
– such lending against wider collateral should routinely be for sufficiently long
maturities to help forestall panic by avoiding rollover risk for the firms with-
out exposing central banks to risk by tying them in for unduly long periods;
– permanent facilities providing bilateral liquidity insurance should routinely
be made available only to commercial banks (and other authorised deposit
takers). They unavoidably need such insurance because their deposit liabili-
ties are money, giving them a vital role, as monetary institutions, in the econ-
omy and financial system;
–b u t  s u c h  public facilities should not be available to banks where in the judg-
ment of the central bank there are serious question-marks over their viability
or solvency. (As I shall discuss later, that need not exhaust our menu for pro-
viding liquidity to individual firms in support operations1.)
But the most vital principle is to avoid creating perverse incentives for banks to
take excessive liquidity risk. There are two elements to this. One is the importance
of the regulatory regime: making banks hold a minimum stock of truly high-
quality liquidity. Internationally, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
and, in the EU, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors are working on
that. In the UK, the FSA is committed to defining core liquidity as just that: inal-
ienably liquid. Defining core liquidity in terms of assets that are eligible for redis-
count at the central bank, as some have argued, is in our view a dangerous course
to take. It could have the unhelpful effect of making central banks lenders of first
rather than of last resort.
1 In the UK, support operations can be effected under the Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding between the
UK’s Tripartite authorities (HMT, FSA and Bank).
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The second element in avoiding perverse incentives is the terms on which liquidity
insurance is available from the central bank. Setting the right pricing is not easy.
Two approaches could, in principle, be adopted. One would be to charge an ex
ante fee, say annually, for access to the liquidity facilities, perhaps based on how
much liquidity risk individual banks had been taking. So far as I know, no central
bank has done that yet, but it should not be ruled out as an idea. The other
approach is, of course, to charge a premium interest rate upon the facilities being
drawn on. The Bank of England has adopted a schedule for our Discount Win-
dow Facility under which the rate charged increases with the size of a drawing
relative to the bank’s size, and also with the illiquidity and riskiness of the collat-
eral provided. We want to underline that banks will end up paying more to draw
on the insurance line if they are overly reliant on illiquid, risky collateral – imply-
ing that their balance sheet was overly exposed to liquidity risk. These consider-
ations have to be taken into account if central banks are to lend against very
broad asset classes; for example, as we flagged earlier in the year, the Bank of
England will be deciding over the coming months whether to extend the collateral
eligible in our Discount Window to portfolios of loans to companies and house-
holds and of equities. The Bank of England also charges a premium rate if a bank
borrows from us against assets comprising securitisations of loans they originated
themselves. This is because there needs to be an incentive to make such securities
marketable; and, more important, it can help to protect us against one of the most
basic risks in banking – the correlation between the quality of a bank’s underwrit-
ing standards and its solvency.
Although central banks need to be ready to lend against a wide range of collat-
eral, we do still need to be careful about precisely what we take. To that end, my
colleagues Paul Fisher and Sarah Breeden will be developing criteria for the struc-
ture and disclosures around the securitisations that will be acceptable to us in
steady state. The ECB is conducting a similar exercise. Since that may have some
read across to the development of the market itself, I hope we can count on active
industry collaboration as we undertake that work.
Before moving on, I should pause for a moment on the Bank’s principle that our
routinely available liquidity insurance facilities should be available only to com-
mercial banks. Now, we do of course realise that, especially in the US, a number
of other kinds of financial firm or vehicle have been given access to special liquid-
ity assistance during this crisis: finance companies, money funds, securities deal-
ers. But in terms of the reform agenda, to our mind this underlines the importance
of ensuring that a shadow banking system, running big maturity mismatches but
offering capital certainty and instant liquidity to savers, does not grow just
beyond the perimeter of bank regulation. This is not an issue just in the US. It
was, after all, the suspension of redemptions by European enhanced-return
money funds that triggered the money market crisis in August 2007. This part of
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the reform agenda – the restructuring of the continuing shadow banking system –
must not be neglected.
2.2. MARKET MAKER OF LAST RESORT?
The purpose of providing liquidity insurance to banks is well known – having
been developed since Bagehot’s day and before. It serves us well to put a finger in
the dyke, with a view to preventing a liquidity panic developing unnecessarily
into a solvency problem through the forced-sale of assets.
But this crisis has reminded everyone that it is not only firms that can suffer
liquidity runs. Markets can too.
Liquidity insurance facilities that underpin banks’ funding are obviously helpful
to preserving market liquidity, as they increase the probability of bank-dealers
being able to finance unwanted inventory.
But arguments have been advanced during the crisis that the authorities should
be able to act more directly to preserve market liquidity, especially if bank-dealers
withdraw from market-making because they become capital constrained. That is,
essentially, the origin of suggestion that central banks should stand ready to act
as Market Makers of Last Resort2. As the amount of credit that gets intermedi-
ated via markets rather than via institutions grows, the need for a MMLR grows
too.
This is by no means straightforward, and not only because it is not central to our
inheritance. Whereas lending to a bank does with certainty give that bank more
liquidity, entering a market as a buyer does not automatically enhance the liquid-
ity of that market in a sustainable way. Also, whereas central banks protect them-
selves against risk in secured loans by requiring more collateral if conditions dete-
riorate, an outright purchase is a one-off transaction; there’s no going back to
renegotiate the price afterwards.
By analogy with the more familiar ‘LOLR’ function, the following thoughts sug-
gest themselves for debate in our community.
– as with LOLR, central banks should only engage in MMLR operations that
do not interfere with monetary policy;
– a MMLR should aim to buy at a discount to the fundamental value of a risky
asset, with the implicit bid-ask spreads unattractive relative to peacetime con-
ditions in private markets but impliedly better than those available during the
2 For example see, W. BUITER and A. SIBERT, 2007, “The Central Bank as Market Maker of Last Resort”,
Maverecon – Willem Buiter’s Blog (http://maverecon.blogspot.com/2007/08/central-bank-as-market-maker-of-
last.html).
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crisis itself. The purchase mechanism should be designed to reveal informa-
tion about the state of the market and the fairness of prices paid;
– while the risk inherent in outright purchases cannot be avoided, the MMLR
absolutely must stay within the capacity determined by its capital resources;
– and crucially, the MMLR should aim to be catalytic, helping ideally to kick-
start a market rather than replace it. And it should avoid propping up mar-
kets that would not be fundamentally viable once the liquidity crisis subsided.
The underlying objective is, as elsewhere, to help to maintain continuity of
the crucial services that the financial system provides to the economy.
In big picture terms, the Bank of England’s programme of auctions to purchase
small amounts of a fairly wide range of sterling corporate bonds can be viewed
as one manifestation of that broad approach to MMLR. The aim has been to aid
improvements in the liquidity of the market, including by reducing the inventory
risk to ‘market makers’.
But our community is some distance from thinking through the extent to which
this kind of thing should feature as a permanent part of our armoury. While not
an urgent issue, it is an important one given the increasing role of capital markets
in our financial system.
2.3. RECOVERY PLANS AND CONTINGENT CAPITAL
Whether provided to individual firms or to markets, routine liquidity insurance
will not always suffice. Sometimes a liquidity problem is triggered by fundamen-
tal problems. Sometimes a liquidity crisis creates credit problems through the
effects of a fire sale of assets. Firms must plan for distress. Not only is that in the
interests of the financial system and, indeed, of the economy more widely, it is in
the interests of firms themselves. At not a few distressed firms around the world,
at times over the past three years the leadership ‘lost it’ under the pressure of
events. Contingency planning is essential. Regulators must make firms do
it – properly. And that means for really disagreeable scenarios.
As the UK’s FSA has recently explained3, the clear recommendation of the G20-
sponsored Financial Stability Board is that these contingency plans need two,
distinct components. A recovery plan for maintaining a going concern. And a
resolution plan for firms that, however regrettably, need to be laid to rest. The
objective in each case is to maintain the financial system’s provision of essential
services to the economy.
3 FSA DP09/4: Turner Review Conference Discussion Paper, A regulatory response to the global banking crisis:
systemically important banks and assessing the cumulative impact.
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Firms themselves need to play a leading role in drawing up ‘recovery plans’. At
least two components are needed, roughly corresponding to liquidity and capital.
First, a contingency funding plan (CFP). Too few banks of any size seem to have
had one in any serious way. There was, for example, too little focus on the effects
of ratings downgrades on collateral calls and on the availability of lines of credit.
And too little attention was paid to core liquidity holdings: a treasury portfolio
comprising the FRNs issued by other banks does not leave a distressed bank with
many options in the face of system-wide stress. Banks need to know exactly what
assets they hold in which securities-depository systems; how long it would take to
deploy them; and which are eligible in which central banks’ routine facilities. Too
few banks had that information readily to hand. Maybe they do now. They should.
The FSA has very kindly agreed to share with the Bank of England the CFPs of
banks (and building societies) where relevant to our functions. As well as helping
us to discharge our financial stability responsibilities more broadly, this will be
useful in making sense of requests to draw from our Discount Window Facility.
Second and beyond liquidity planning, recovery can involve derisking. This might
mean laying off risk, shedding positions or even selling businesses. Once in dis-
tress, banks absolutely must be prepared to shrink their franchise in order to
sustain themselves. That may entail having businesses set up within groups in a
way that would facilitate sale, if necessary. Sometimes what a group regards as its
core franchise will not map exactly into what the authorities think of as the essen-
tial economic services it provides. That is obviously for discussion between firms
and their regulators, who need to be ready to exercise powers to force risk-reduc-
tion and recapitalisation where necessary to preserve the soundness of the enter-
prise and the stability of the system.
‘De-risking’ is all about the capital resources of banks in the face of idiosyncratic
or widespread stress. There is, therefore, a read across from the ‘Living Wills’
exercise to the question of how much capital banks should hold. Almost no
amount of capital is enough if things are bad enough. Which is why contingent
capital might potentially be an important element in banks’ recovery plans, as the
Governor set out recently in Edinburgh4.
This would not be the kind of hybrid capital that mushroomed in the decade or
so leading up to the crisis. The familiar types of subordinated debt can absorb
4 M. A. KING, 2009, “Speech by Mervyn King, Governor” to Scottish Business Organisations, Edinburgh,
October 2009. See also P. M. W. TUCKER, 2009a, “Remarks by Paul Tucker”, Panel session at the Turner
Review Conference, London, March 2009 (pp. 5) and P. M. W. TUCKER, 2009b, “The repertoire of official
sector interventions in the financial system: last resort lending, market-making, and capital”, Bank of Japan’s
2009 International Conference, Tokyo, May 2009, (pp. 19). In the academic community, the idea was aired in
“An Expedited Resolution Mechanism for Distressed Financial Firms: Regulatory Hybrid Securities”, Squam
Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, April 2009, Council on Foreign Relations. W. C. DUDLEY, 2009,
“Remarks by William Dudley” at the Institute of International Bankers Membership Luncheon, New York City,
October 2009.
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losses only if a bank is put into liquidation, and so really has no place in regula-
tory capital requirements as we cannot rely on liquidation as the only resolution
tool. It has been a faultline in the design of the financial system as a whole that
banks issued securities that counted as capital for regulatory purposes, and on
which they could therefore leverage up, but with institutional investors treating
them as very low risk investments backing household pension and annuity sav-
ings.
By contrast, contingent capital would be debt that converted into common, loss-
absorbing equity if a bank hit turbulence. It is, in effect, a form of catastrophe
insurance provided by the private sector.
Why should long-term savings institutions and asset managers be prepared to
provide such insurance? One possible reason is that if enough of them were to do
so for enough banks, it might well help to protect the value of their investment
portfolios more generally. If ever it needed to be demonstrated, the current crisis
has surely put it beyond doubt – not only for our generation but for the next one
too – that serious distress in the banking system deepens an economic downturn
and so impairs pretty well all asset values. By taking a hit in one part of their
portfolio by providing equity protection to banks, institutions might well be able
to support the value of their investments more widely. And the trigger for conver-
sion from debt into equity could be at a margin of comfort away from true catas-
trophe; say, a percentage point or so above the minimum regulatory capital ratio.
Of course, this would entail a structural shift over time in investment portfolios.
But the system might be able to manage that adjustment. After all, it managed the
all together less desirable adjustment to the development of the existing hybrid
capital markets. But demand for contingent capital is, inevitably, uncertain at this
stage. As are the terms on which it will be provided. We welcome the growing
private sector focus on this.
2.4. RESOLUTION OF BANK FAILURES
If recovery plans prove wanting, then distressed banks need to be ‘resolved’ – laid
to rest, but without undermining crucial economic services. Sometimes the best
course will be a straightforward, whole-bank liquidation, with retail depositors
receiving a payout from the insurance fund. But, alternatively, resolution can
involve selling the deposit book – and so the vital payments services – to another
bank. Good assets might go with the deposits, or be transferred elsewhere. Bad
(or at least unsaleable) assets go into run off. Choosing the best course is central
to effective resolution planning.
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To split up and transfer the different parts of a bank, the authorities obviously
need specific and extensive powers. The broad model is provided by the Deposit
Insurance Corporations of the USA and Canada. The UK has recently introduced
such powers, having learnt the hard way that we needed them. A number of other
countries in the EU adapt their normal corporate insolvency regime for the special
structure of banks, but do not all have the option to break up and transfer differ-
ent parts of the business. This is the subject of the recent consultation paper pub-
lished by the European Commission5.
In the UK, the Bank of England has become the Special Resolution Authority. We
have been helped by the hands-on operational expertise necessary for our market
operations and for running the wholesale payments system. This new responsibil-
ity has given us an interesting vantage point on the preconditions for effective
resolution. In the first place, let me tell you that it is very information-intensive.
It requires a lot of detail on how a bank’s business is structured and run. And that
information needs to be available at an early stage. Amongst many things, it
includes details of netting and derivative contracts, and I am struck that, in the
US, the FDIC now requires troubled banks to demonstrate that they could report
each day the relevant details of derivative portfolios. The Bank of England plans
to consider whether or not something like that might be warranted in the UK.
More generally, the UK FSA has said that the authorities will need to be assured
that firms are able to provide the necessary data to assess resolution options and
to execute the authorities’ chosen strategy.
But it is not just the resolution authority which needs lots of information. Poten-
tial bidders for all or parts of an ailing bank do too – of the kind typically offered
to bidders in a ‘friendly’ M&A transaction. Banks probably need routinely to
maintain such ‘Data Rooms’ as part of their contingency plans  –  something
which the FSA is examining.
As will be abundantly clear from this brief review, the ‘recovery and resolution
plan’ enterprise requires the regulators to work closely with the resolution
authorities, and with central banks as liquidity providers. In the UK, wearing our
‘resolution authority’ hat, the Bank hopes to be able to work closely with individ-
ual banks and the FSA in helping to specify and guide what is needed in practice.
My colleague Andrew Bailey will be discussing in more detail tomorrow one of
the issues raised by past cases.
The enterprise also entails thinking beyond the resolution of modest-sized domes-
tic banks. Both the US and UK authorities are exploring how to extend resolution
regimes to bank holding companies and to other types of firm that could prove
5 Communication from the European Commission, An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in
the Banking Sector, 20 October 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/crisis_management/
index_en.htm#overview.
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systemically significant in some circumstances. As present, no one thinks that
Large and Complex Financial Institutions could be resolved at all smoothly, as
the rescues of the past twelve months show.
2.4.1. Cross-border Resolutions and the International 
‘Living Wills’ Exercise
There is, therefore, a substantial international dimension to this work, which is
being facilitated by the Financial Stability Board. Over the next few months, the
top 25 or so banks and dealers in the world will be working with the authorities
to produce recovery and resolution plans. The effort will involve not only line
supervisors but also resolution authorities and central banks. Firms are expected
to produce recovery plans. For obvious reasons, resolution plans need to be pro-
duced by the authorities, while still drawing on inputs from the firms. In the UK,
the FSA has recently published how they will approach this international effort6.
It is a formidable task. Working with the FSB secretariat, my role, as chairman to
the Cross-Border Crisis Management Working Group, will be to help colleagues
to flush out the issues, so that they can be properly debated and reviewed by G20
Ministers and Governors later next year. With the European Commission on the
FSB and also the resolution working group, I hope that will also help to inform
work at the European level.
There will quite probably be hard questions. They could include whether some-
thing needs to be done about the complex structures and organisation of some
banks. Another big issue might be which services truly need to be maintained.
Whether there are conflicts between the insolvency laws and special resolution
regimes of different countries that would materially impede effective resolution
for some groups. And another would be whether losses can in the future credibly
be made to fall on wholesale creditors. Maybe even about burden sharing
amongst national authorities if fiscal support proves unavoidable when an inter-
nationally active bank fails. In all this the objective, of course, is to get to a place
where taxpayers’ resources are not needed, implicitly or explicitly, to underpin
the national and international credit systems. And some of those operational
questions, therefore, shade into the broader debates about the structure and reg-
ulation of the financial system7.
Of that list of issues, I should highlight two today.
6 Financial Services Authority Turner Review Conference Discussion Paper, A regulatory response to the global
banking crisis: systemically important banks and assessing the cumulative impact, FSA DP 09/4.
7 M. A.  KING, 2009, “Speech by Mervyn King, Governor” to Scottish Business Organisations, Edinburgh,
October 2009.
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The first is the entanglements and conflicts that can exist between home and host
insolvency and resolution laws. There is, for example, a first-order difference
between, on the one hand, countries whose regime effectively permits a de facto
ring-fencing of locally domiciled assets for local depositors and, on the other
hand, those that treat liquidation as a joined-up, global exercise, with all unen-
cumbered assets shared pro rata across senior unsecured creditors.
These issues are not new. They were highlighted nearly twenty years ago by the
closure of BCCI’s operations around the world8. Subsequently, in Europe, insol-
vency law for banks was improved through the Credit Institutions Reorganisa-
tion and Winding-Up Directive. There is a single-entity insolvency regime for any
bank incorporated in the EEA, applying to the parent bank and also to all its
branches throughout the EEA. We also have, in the Settlement Finality Directive,
a sound legal basis for the integrity of wholesale payments transfers in the event
of a default, without which the effects of failure could be truly devastating. And
in the Financial Collateral Directive, we have an assurance that national insol-
vency or reorganisation measures cannot be applied to prevent or delay counter-
parties of a failed institution from exercising their rights to close out, net and/or
enforce their security interests in order to realise financial collateral. But we do
not yet have compatible bank resolution regimes, and some existing Directives
were designed without resolution in mind.
We now have another chance. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has
published an extensive review of impediments to the resolution of cross-border
banks arising from national insolvency laws, resolution regimes, or supervisory
practices. And the European Commission has recently launched a consultation
asking what changes to the European legislative framework are needed to address
these issues. We need to focus on who should take what concrete actions. I think
the FSB will be picking up that issue.
2.5. RESOLUTION AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS: WHO 
SHOULD PICK UP THE TAB?
The second issue concerning resolution I want to say something about is the allo-
cation of losses to creditors and to the official sector from support operations. The
formal position varies between support for insured deposits and for other creditors.
8 Basel committee on Banking Supervision, 1992, “The insolvency liquidation of a multinational bank”, Bank
for International Settlements. Its key conclusions were: (1) when closing a multinational bank, supervisors
should pay attention to the nature and timing of communications among themselves and of their communica-
tions with creditors, shareholders and management; (2) the nature of liquidation rules may be relevant to the
manner in which multinational banks are supervised; (3) differences in liquidation rules across jurisdictions in
a winding-up can affect returns to depositors and other creditors and the operations of deposit protection
schemes; and 4) coordination and cooperation between liquidators can affect the returns to creditors in a liqui-
dation and can be affected by the role of supervisors in a liquidation.
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2.5.1. Deposit Insurance and Risk-based Premia
Insured deposits are, of course, insured. It is often assumed that governments
stand behind such schemes. But governments do not have pick up the final tab.
Such schemes are ultimately paid for by the banks themselves. Whether schemes
are funded or not, governments have a legal right to make recoveries from the
residual banking industry over the succeeding years.
There is, still, a question of the basis of the levy. This arises most clearly in a
system which guarantees 100% repayment up to some meaningful amount (now
£ 50,000 in the UK). While it has many merits, complete cover affects the dynam-
ics of the market place in a potentially unhelpful way. It makes it easier for banks
to pay up for deposits. The implied signal that a bank offering a high return
would be taking greater risk than others, as it would have to, does not matter to
the depositors. They are covered, and so are induced to place their money wher-
ever they can achieve the best returns.
That is a recipe for imprudent risk taking. One possible way of addressing it
would be to make such risk-taking banks pay a higher levy into the insurance
scheme. The Bank of England thinks that this deserves serious consideration, and
it is now the subject of debate in the UK.
2.5.2. Beyond Deposit Insurance: How Can the Industry 
Bear the Cost of Rescues?
During the current crisis, around the world governments have gone much further
than protecting only insured depositors – uninsured wholesale creditors have
been bailed out too. The need for such support operations was evident if complete
systemic collapse was to be averted. But it does raise big questions looking
ahead – of fairness and of incentives. Once more, we need some principles for
what are in effect official Capital of Last Resort (CofLR) operations.
One possible starting point is how central banks have learned to think about
bespoke liquidity-support operations, so called Emergency Liquidity Assistance.
After explicitly recognising that occasionally liquidity support operations can end
up providing de facto risk capital if the recipient deteriorates, the late Eddie
George offered some thoughts on this in 19939; “central banks are not in the
business of providing public subsidy to private shareholders. If we do provide
support, we will try to structure it so that any losses fall first on the shareholders
and any benefits come first to us. And any support we provide will be on terms
9 “The pursuit of financial stability”, LSE lecture by the late Eddie George, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin,
1997; and Mervyn King’s September 2007 letter to the Treasury Select Committee, “Turmoil in financial
markets: what can central banks do?”.
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that are as penal as we can make them, without precipitating the collapse we are
trying to avoid… We look for a clean exit. The company may be required to run
down or restructure its operations, under our surveillance, to the point where it
can do without our support. We aim to protect the system, not to keep in being
unviable banking capacity…” And, paraphrasing Mervyn King in 2007: “if the
[authorities] underwrite any [risk] that threatens to damage the economy as a
whole, it encourages the view that as long as a bank takes the same sort of risks
that other banks are taking then it is more likely that their problems will be
insured ex post.”
That provides a useful context for the debate about whether the cost of bailouts
can somehow be recovered from the industry. Compared with a year ago, a
number of ideas are now in circulation. One possibility is to establish a fund in
advance. Another is to raise a levy on the surviving banks.
An argument in favour of the former is that it would raise contributions from
risky banks before they fail. And it would allow the levies to be related to the size
of their uninsured creditors, as some in the US have suggested10. But I do just
wonder whether it would be realistic to raise, and over the decades sustain, a
sufficiently large fund.
The alternative, as I have discussed before11, is to raise a levy from surviving firms
after the event. This would have to be linked to a systemic-crisis threshold being
passed for the deployment of public funds. And the basis for deciding how much
was recovered from individual firms would need to be both clear and principled.
In particular, it would be important to try to incorporate features that enabled
costs of failures somehow to fall to uninsured, wholesale creditors. Those who
finance the system in the good times need to have incentives to price for risk.
2.6. SUMMARY
This has been a fairly high-level survey of the instruments on the crisis manage-
ment menu. They are, of course, interlinked. They also bear on the wider debates
about the structure and regulation of the financial system. Perhaps most obvi-
ously, the feasibility of producing recovery and resolution plans will feed into
international and domestic decisions on minimum capital requirements for banks
in general and on the mooted add-ons for so-called systemically significant firms.
The weaker a recovery plan and the greater the obstacles in the way of its effective
resolution, the more capital (and liquidity) a bank is going to have to hold. This
10 See the recent statement by Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, to the Financial
Services Committee; US House of Representatives, 29 October, 2009.
11 See P. M. W. TUCKER, 2009b, “The repertoire of official sector interventions in the financial system: last resort
lending, market-making, and capital”, Bank of Japan’s 2009 International Conference, Tokyo, May 2009,
(pp. 18).
SUERF2010.book  Page 24  Monday, March 22, 2010  3:04 PMTHE CRISIS MANAGEMENT MENU 25
larcier
is why emerging interest in Contingent Capital instruments is so important. If
CoCos could form a material part of recovery plans, the landscape might just be
transformed.
And that in turn goes to the big issue. Whether our community can find ways of
distributing the costs of official sector support operations back to the system and
its uninsured creditors rather than to the general taxpayer. If we can achieve that,
market discipline would be enhanced. We need to hang on to ‘market discipline’
as a watchword in these debates. The goal of re-regulation – of redrawing the
rules of the game for the financial system – should not be to reintroduce the wis-
dom of the state into micro decisions about how to run businesses. But rather to
put market discipline at the heart of a market economy. An effective framework
for crisis management drawing on the lessons of this crisis can take us in that
direction.
SUERF2010.book  Page 25  Monday, March 22, 2010  3:04 PMSUERF2010.book  Page 26  Monday, March 22, 2010  3:04 PM27
larcier
3. THE IMPACT OF THE LIQUIDITY CRISIS ON 
COMMERCIAL BANKS: THE CASE OF DEXIA
Johan Evenepoel
3.1. INTRODUCTION
The liquidity crisis had a particular effect on commercial banks – in particularly
those, like Dexia, with a network of treasury centres all around the world. The
support of the central banks to the financial sector was essential in limiting the
effects of the crisis – with the intervention of the ECB being necessary to ensure
the survival of many banks within Europe, and the intervention of the Federal
Reserve in the United States. After briefly summarising the liquidity crisis, I
switch attention to the changes in the banking system precipitated by the liquidity
crisis – banks were forced to implement many solutions to address the specific
problems they encountered. Dexia was no exception to this and whilst solutions
have been implemented to address the immediate effects of the liquidity crisis,
further new challenges lie ahead.
3.2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LIQUIDITY CRISIS
During the liquidity crisis, the role of central banks as liquidity provider was of
an importance unseen in recent times. Within the Eurosystem, the ECB’s liquidity
provision rose substantially – the supply of liquidity being unlimited in all tenors:
prior to the onset of the crisis in August 2008 the ECB provided approxi-
mately EUR 450bn in liquidity – with its liquidity provision subsequently peak-
ing at EUR 900bn in July 2009. Had the ECB not intervened in this way, many
European banks would no longer exist.
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Figure 1: The ECB as a Liquidity Provider (September 2008 – November 2009)
Source: ECB.
Examining the liquidity-providing operations of the Eurosystem during the crisis,
there has also been another substantial change. In previously normal conditions,
the Eurosystem had conducted weekly and three-month liquidity-providing oper-
ations. During the crisis, however, this range has been extended by euro opera-
tions with maturities of (around) one month, six months and one year, as illus-
trated in figure 2. Further operations also provide US dollar and Swiss franc
liquidity, and the Eurosystem has also launched a programme for purchasing
euro-denominated covered bonds.
Figure 2: Outstanding Open Market Operations of the ECB (at 11 November 2009)
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Other Central Banks also took far-reaching measures. In the United States, for
example, the Federal Reserve supported the financial sector heavily by introduc-
ing a number of innovative instruments in order to ensure the efficient manage-
ment of the USD short-term supply. As illustrated in figure 3, the innovations
included the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), Primary Dealer Credit
Facilities (PDCF), Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), in the course of 2008.
Figure 3: US Federal Reserve Liquidity Facilities (January 2008 – November 2009)
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The announced discontinuation or scaling back of such facilities (e.g. the Fed’s
TSLF and CPFF facilities) has led many people to ask whether the crisis is now
over. In trying to provide an answer, many market participants refer to the spread
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Figure 4: Cash-OIS Spreads for EUR and USD in 1 Month and 3 Months Time Brackets
Source: Bloomberg.
In EUR, on a 3 months basis, the spread in November 2009 stood at around 30
bp, which was much lower than the spread seen during the height of the crisis in
October and November 2008. Similarly the LIBOR-OIS 3M spread, peaked at
364 bp in October 2008, at the height of the crisis. In my opinion, we will con-
tinue to keep an important spread because liquidity has a price.
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Having examined the recent spread, we might be tempted to reach the conclusion
that the crisis is over. To make such a declaration, however, would be premature
as there is future uncertainty about how the market will react, and about how the
liquidity premium will evolve, once central banks exit strategies are implemented.
3.3. HOW DID THE CRISIS AFFECT DEXIA’S LIQUIDITY 
MANAGEMENT?
3.3.1. Disruption of the Interbank Market
The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 led to the complete collapse
of the unsecured market, while simultaneously greatly reducing liquidity in the
secured market. As a consequence many market participants found it very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to raise cash even against government bonds.
This necessitated a scrupulous review of the repo business, with several questions
needing to be re-assessed with great urgency:
– the rating of a security became less important than the liquidity of a security,
while concepts like the ‘quotation age’ of assets have increasingly gained in
importance in assessing liquidity risk;
– a haircut of 20% for AA rated securities is not always enough;
– what if you have offered  EUR 250m in cash via tri-party repo and you
received 300 pieces of collateral? How quickly can you sell your collateral in
the case of stress?
– do you have sufficient expertise within your team and a framework to hedge
the interest rate risk and credit risk of all bonds you receive once the event of
default materializes?
The liquidity squeeze in the repo markets illustrated the fact that banks had over-
estimated their liquidity buffers. Dexia implemented a completely new definition
and classification of what the bank considered ‘available securities’: only securi-
ties which may be used in prime bilateral repo or central bank operations can be
taken into account to calculate the liquidity buffer. Dexia defines prime bilateral
collateral as securities which may be used via one of the two major European
Central Repo Counterparties (CCP) – LCH and Clearnet – as the crisis made it
clear that repos via a CCP were always possible. Furthermore the eligibility crite-
ria for tri-party repo have changed completely: sufficient haircuts and strict rules
concerning quotation age and concentration limits have become crucial.
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3.3.2. Disruption of the Foreign Exchange (FX) Market
During the first days of the liquidity crisis, the FX market came to a complete
halt. Already by August 9, 2008 it had become impossible to create USD funding
via the FX swap market. During the crisis, banks had real problems financing
liquidity positions in some specific currencies – in particular positions held in
Canadian dollars (CAD) and Mexican peso (MXN).
In order to protect the bank from the occurrence of such FX market meltdowns,
Dexia has set very strict liquidity limits per currency and per geographic time
zone. An important parameter of a business continuity procedure is not only to
have a solid limit structure but also to have full understanding of the different
clearing systems, such as CLS, and their respective limit architecture.
3.3.3. Adequate Reporting on Available Central Bank 
Eligible Securities within the Group
Adequate reporting both on available central bank eligible securities and the posi-
tions that may influence collateral requirements has become essential, but caution
must be exercised, in particular to avoid overestimates or underestimates. For
example, it is important to correctly reflect off-balance sheet commitments, such
as Guaranteed Investment Contracts (GICs) which had to be included, in order
to avoid a downgrading which in turn could lead to the triggering of margin calls.
Moreover, transactions under Credit Support Annexes (CSAs) must be included
as market moves will trigger margin calls which would be linked to our deriva-
tives business. Moreover, since European entities have no direct access to the FED
monetary policy instruments; the focus on available FED eligible collateral may
consequently be less intensive.
Dexia adopted the following architecture to achieve this:
– establishment of a common database of all securities in the Group, with no
interlinking of the many different systems;
– implementation of Competence Centres in regard to central bank eligible
securities. For example: Front Office / Back Office / Middle Office in New
York are responsible for a daily follow-up of all FED eligible securities avail-
able in the Group regardless of where the securities are located;
– modelling of collateral needs for GICs, CSA contracts as well as of securities
‘at risk’ (securities scoring low in eligibility criteria).
This strategy is supported by the bank’s experience that, even at the high of the
liquidity crisis, Dexia was never confronted with operational problems relating to
the transfer of securities from one entity to another, within Europe, to the US or
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even to Tokyo. Intra-day deliveries from DBB and Luxembourg to DCL NY never
encountered any problems.
3.3.4. Adequate Tools to Follow up Consolidated Liquidity 
Positions Intra-day and to Realize Liquidity 
Projections
The right tools are paramount in order to monitor and manage all liquidity posi-
tions of the Group on a real-time basis and facilitate the projection of liquidity
positions in the near and medium term. During the crisis we organized up to 6
conference calls a day, with all entities attending, in order to obtain the latest
liquidity position in each currency. The crisis highlighted the critical role of solid
reporting tools, therefore making the Cash and Liquidity Management architec-
ture project the highest priority. This architecture includes the development of the
required reporting and the acquisition of an efficient tool.
Dexia had already acquired a multi-company tool, Aleri. All entities are inter-
faced to this system, making it possible to have real-time liquidity position man-
agement and to realize liquidity projections of the consolidated liquidity position.
3.4. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CRISIS
As the liquidity crisis unfolded, Dexia’s Cash and Liquidity Management (CLM)
was in the process of reviewing its overall treasury structure, which operated
using decentralized liquidity management with centralized monitoring at Group
level. A new organisational structure and operational guidelines had already been
scheduled, but had not yet been fully implemented.
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In light of the number of treasury centres within the group, it became apparent
that our initial plans needed to be adjusted in order to organize our liquidity
management in such a way that it would be able to withstand liquidity crises and
their subsequent problems. Subsequent reassessment of the project led to several
conclusions being reached. Across the Group a considerable number of independ-
ent, noninterfaced IT systems were existing to follow up the different liquidity
positions and available collateral for secured transactions (i.e. central bank ten-
ders, bilateral repo, triparty repo, etc.). It was also apparent that there had not
been a sufficient definition of market access principles, a lack of both guidelines
for the distribution of liquidity within the Group and adequate consolidated
reporting at Group level, as was the Group’s consolidated reporting.
A management decision was taken to run off activities in countries completely
where no access to domestic funding was available. It was necessary to adopt
another organisational set-up in order to enhance our projected architecture. This
adjusted organisational set-up consisted of 3 major steps. By implementing an
enhanced treasury organization, which in turn would evolve towards an even
more centralized and integrated organization, market access and price setting
principles were also redefined, with all entities managing cash transactions being
integrated. The new treasury governance structure was formalized following the
establishment of new guidelines. Finally support and reporting tools were opti-
mized in order to facilitate the real time follow up of liquidity positions and avail-
able collateral.
3.4.1. Implementation of a Completely New Treasury 
Organization
3.4.1.1. A Centralized and Integrated Organization
Even though the centralisation principle had already been adopted by Dexia
CLM, the liquidity crisis further emphasised the more pronounced role that the
Treasury Management Group would have to play. On a Group level, the Treasury
Management Centre now decides on market access principles. The TMC is sup-
ported by Competence Centres, sub-divided according to their main currency,
which are responsible for the liquidity gaps and end-of-day squaring for their
competence currency. A number of treasury centres were shut down, some of
them instead becoming captive treasuries, working together on the matched fund-
ing principle with the competence centres.
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Figure 6: Dexia’s New Centralized Treasury Organization
3.4.1.2. Redefined Market Access Principles
Market access principles at Dexia have now been redefined, being organized
dependent on the type of client. While some types of client use a local access
model, other types of client have a single target model conducted through a spe-
cific Competence Centre. For foreign exchange swaps with a term of under one
month, all competence centres can conclude the swap, whereas where there is a
term of longer than 1 month then only the competence centres are able to con-
clude foreign exchange swaps in their competence centre currency. One exception
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Table 1: Redefined Market Access Principles
3.4.2. Treasury Governance
Treasury governance was completely reviewed and a new organisational structure
implemented. Mandates have been drafted by the legal department to describe
which powers are delegated from the entities to the Treasury Management Cen-
tre, also taking into account the rules of the domestic regulators.
3.5. NEW CHALLENGES FOR INTEGRATED LIQUIDITY 
MANAGEMENT
The implementation of the complete new treasury organization within Dexia will
allow various operational, organizational and governance issues to be addressed.
In so doing crossborder use of liquidity will also be optimized. However, this
throws up a number of new challenges that will also need to be addressed.
Within the eurozone, it will be necessary to implement different liquidity ratios.
On the one hand there is no uniform time horizon, with a different time horizon
of up to 1 week in some countries whilst the time horizon is at least 1 month in
other countries. On the other hand there are also differing definitions of liquidity
reserves, and some securities may be eligible in one country but not in another.
TYPE OF CLIENT TARGET MODEL
Secured deposits  
Bilateral Repos
Tri-party Repos
Main: Brussels; limited for Rome, Berlin, Luxembourg
Main: Brussels; limited for Luxembourg
Central bank tenders Local access
Unsecured deposits  
Fiduciary deposits Luxembourg
CD/CP: Certificate of Deposits/
Commercial Papers
Local access
Non bank client deposits Local access
Interbank deposits Local access
Central bank/Supranational deposits Main: Brussels; limited for New York, London, Paris, 
Luxembourg
Derivatives  
FX Swaps – All competence centres can conclude FX swaps < 1 
month in all currencies
– Competence centres conclude FX swaps > 1 month in 
their competence currency
– DCL Paris market access for FX swaps < 1 month
Others Local access
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The execution of intragroup security swaps allows this problem to be addressed
to a certain extent, although the regulatory framework of some countries places
heavy restrictions on the use of intragroup transactions, even on a secured basis.
It is clear that these challenges can negatively impact a centralized liquidity man-
agement.
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4. A TRAFFIC LIGHT ILLUSTRATION OF THE 
ACTION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
DURING THE 2007-2009 CRISIS
Francesco Papadia1
This paper uses a traffic light metaphor to illustrate the different phases of the
2007-2009 financial crisis and, in particular, the action of the European Central
Bank to deal with the liquidity component of this crisis. As colours can not be
reproduced in this article, shadings in white and varieties of grey distinguish the
different phases. Still a green, yellow, red, yellow sequence will be referred to in
the paper. The traffic light metaphor is, as any metaphor, a tool aiming to help
the communication of a concept, not something to be interpreted mechanically.
In particular, unlike with a real traffic light, in the real world there is no deter-
ministic pattern in the sequence of phases and it is not at all granted that a ‘green’
phase will follow the yellow one with which this article ends.
There is one indicator (Figure 1) that has been widely used to measure the inten-
sity of the crisis: the difference between the interest rate on interbank unsecured
lending (Euribor) and the interest rate on interest rate swaps of the same maturity
(Overnight index Swap – OIS). This indicator, the behaviour of which is very
similar to that of the spread between unsecured and secured (repo) lending,
reflects the compensation which banks require to bear the risk of not receiving
back the money lent (credit premium) and the risk of needing it before the matu-
rity of the transaction (liquidity premium).
1 European Central Bank. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily represent those of the institu-
tion to which the author is affiliated. The help of Dimitrios Rakitzis in preparing the statistical material is
gratefully acknowledged.
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Figure 1. Euribor-Overnight Index Swap Spread. 1 Week, 1 Month And 3 Month 
Maturities. Basis Points. January 2007-November 2009
This indicator is used to identify four phases in the crisis:
– the green phase before August 9th 2007;
– the yellow phase between that date and the failure of Lehman Brothers in mid
September 2008;
– the red phase after September 2008; and
– a second yellow phase after May 2009.
These phases apply equally well to the euro as to the dollar and the British pound,
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Figure 2. Euribor/Libor – Overnight Index Swap Spread. 3 Month Maturity for Euro, US 
Dollar and British Pound. Basis Points. January 2007-November 2009
In the green phase the compensation for both the liquidity and the credit risks was
very low, largely contained within 10 basis points, in the euro area as well as in
the United Kingdom and the United States. On 9 August 2007, when the first
yellow phase started, the required compensation for these two risks grew by a
factor of 7 to 12, reaching in some cases the 100 basis points mark. Then, with
the red phase after mid-September 2008, the joint effect of the liquidity and of the
credit risk spread literally exploded, reaching a peak of 300 basis points in the
case of the British pound and more than 350 for the dollar. It was only in spring
2009 that the spread returned to the region of the yellow, pre-Lehman phase, with
a gradual further narrowing in the subsequent months.
Of course, the term compensation evokes a positive welfare connotation, but
one’s compensation is another person’s cost and, in this case, it was the economy
which was asked to pay much more for the intermediation function carried out
by banks. These, in turn, had much higher credit and liquidity risk as well as great
losses on their existing positions, which vastly exceeded the benefit of a higher
return on the flow of new lending. As a consequence, both the real and the finan-
cial sector of the economy suffered grave consequences from the crisis.
A similar pattern can be seen in other indicators, such as the spread between the
yields of different sovereign issuers in the euro area and in the spread between
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Figure 3. Spread between the Yield on Italian, Greek and French 10 Year Bonds to 
German Bonds with the Same Maturity; Euribor-Overnight Index Swap Spread, 3 Month 
Maturity; Spread between Yield on 10 Year and 2 year German Bonds. Basis Points. 
January 2007-November 2009
Also the ability of the European Central Bank to keep the overnight rate of inter-
est close to its policy rate, which defined the precision of its implementation of
monetary policy, deteriorated significantly during the crisis, albeit to different
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Figure 4. Overnight Interest Rate (EONIA); Marginal Lending and Deposit Rates and 
Minimum Bid Rate on Main Refinancing Operations. January 2007-November 2009. 
Percentage Points
While in the green phase the overnight rate remained consistently close to the
policy rate, in the yellow phase the overnight rate deviated significantly from the
policy rate, especially at its beginning, when the stabilizing effect of reserve
requirements became much weaker and the European Central Bank found it dif-
ficult to offset, by means of changes in the supply of liquidity, the sharp changes
in its demand from banks. Then, in the red phase a new phenomenon appeared:
the overnight rate was systematically lower than the policy rate, which the Euro-
pean Central Bank cut sharply from 4.25 to 1.00 per cent between October 2008
and May 2009. This was the effect of counterparties, which now could have as
much liquidity as they wished at the low policy rate, asking for far more liquidity
than was needed to satisfy reserve requirements and the effect of autonomous
factors. Eventually, in the second yellow phase, the stability of the overnight rate
was regained, but at a level closer to that of the deposit facility, i.e. 25 basis
points, than to that of the policy rate, i.e. 100 basis points given that liquidity
continued to exceed by far reserve requirements and autonomous factors.


































































Minimum bid rate Deposit rate Marginal lending rate EONIA
Figure 4
green yellow red yellow
SUERF2010.book  Page 43  Monday, March 22, 2010  3:04 PM44 CRISIS MANAGEMENT AT CROSS-ROADS
larcier
Figure 5. Liquidity Provision and Absorption by the Eurosystem. Euro Billion. January 
2007-November 2009
In the green phase, the liquidity provision of the Eurosystem was very simple:
banks were offered two refinancing opportunities, in addition to the standing
facilities: one-week maturity operations, so called Main Refinancing Operations,
offered every week, and three-month maturity operations, so called Longer Term
Operations, offered on a monthly basis. Faithful to their names, the Main Refi-
nancing Operations covered about two thirds of all the liquidity needs of banks,
with the complement being covered by Longer Term Operations. In the green
period, the so called Fine Tuning Operations with an overnight maturity were
infrequent and carried out only in very special circumstances.
In the yellow phase, the refinancing operations of the Eurosystem became some-
what more complex. A new maturity, of six months, was added to the Longer
Term Operations. Together with a larger volume of three month operations, the
introduction of six month operations contributed to invert the proportion
between liquidity provided by Longer-Term Operations – now two thirds of the
total – and that provided by the (by now misnamed) Main Refinancing Opera-
tions, reduced to one third. Fine-tuning operations became more frequent and, in
some circumstances, liquidity provision, still under the control of the European
Central Bank, exceeded the needs created by reserve requirements and autono-
mous factors. As a result, banks placed the excess liquidity in the deposit facility
of the Eurosystem. Another quite extraordinary development was the provision
by the European Central Bank of liquidity in foreign currency, specifically US
dollars and Swiss francs, in agreement with the Federal Reserve of the United
States and the Swiss National Bank respectively2. This move, which is not found
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impaired ability of the market to provide foreign currency liquidity to banks
needing it.
In the red phase, liquidity provision and absorption from the Eurosystem became
both much larger and more complex. These two phenomena resulted from the
interaction between the policy changes decided by the central bank and the
behaviour of banks. The most important policy change by the European Central
Bank in this respect was the move from a situation in which it controlled the
amount of liquidity granted to banks, to one in which the choice is left to banks.
In fact in October 2008, to fight the inordinate level achieved by the liquidity risk
– which was one very important factor in the explosion of the spread between the
Euribor and the Overnight index swap rate seen above (Papadia and Välimäki
2009) – the European Central Bank changed the tender modality of its refinanc-
ing operations to a so called fixed-rate full allotment approach, in which banks
can have all the liquidity they want at the policy rate of interest. This move of the
central bank was accompanied by the addition of another maturity (1 month) to
Longer Term Operations (actually called STRO: Special Term Refinancing Oper-
ations) and by a much more frequent offering of longer term operations (up to 4
per maintenance period). The behaviour of banks strongly interacted with the
new refinancing opportunities offered by the European Central Bank: the demand
for liquidity far exceeded what was needed to fund the needs stemming from
reserve requirements and autonomous factors and the excess was placed at the
deposit facility of the Eurosystem. In economic terms, what happened is that
banks became much less willing to trade liquidity among themselves, because of
the much larger liquidity and credit risk, and so the central bank had to interme-
diate funds between the banks which had an excess of liquidity and those which
had a dearth of it. To some extent, banks wanted to lend liquidity only to the
central bank and this was the only institution willing to fund certain other banks.
In the second yellow phase, which started in spring of 2009, another important
innovation took place, as the European Central Bank decided to add a one year
maturity to its Longer Term Operations. This proved extremely popular with
banks, so much that, in November 2009, the two operations conducted with this
maturity covered a dominant share (85%-90%) of the liquidity provision by the
central bank.
A more complete view of the balance sheet of the Eurosystem and of its evolution
during the crisis is given in Figure 6.
2 In chart 5, only the effect of the Swiss Franc operations can be seen, as these affected the liquidity in euro, being
provided in the form of swaps from the Eurosystem. The effects of the dollar operations, which did not affect
euro liquidity as they were offered in the form of repurchase operations, can only be seen in the subsequent
chart 6.
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Figure 6. Total Size and Composition of the Balance Sheet of the Eurosystem on 27 July 
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In the green phase, the total size of the balance sheet of the Eurosystem is already
quite large, slightly above 900 billion euro, but its composition is relatively sim-
ple: The liability side is dominated by banknotes, followed by banks’ current
accounts, or reserves, and then by government deposits and other autonomous
factors. The asset side is nearly equally split between domestic and foreign assets
portfolios, on one hand, i.e. financial assets held mostly by national central
banks, and refinancing operations, in the form of Main Refinancing Operations
and Longer Term Refinancing operations, on the other hand. Fine tuning opera-
tions and standing facilities are either absent or too small to be visible.
In the first yellow phase, the balance sheet of the Eurosystem grows to more than
one trillion (€ 1059 billion) and it gets more complex: on the liability side, one
now sees the effect of Fine Tuning Operations, the deposit facility and the claims
of the Federal Reserve and the Swiss National Bank, corresponding to the US
dollar and Swiss francs lent to the European Central Bank for further distribution
to Eurosystem counterparties in need of foreign liquidity. On the asset side one
sees, in addition to the different proportion between Main Refinancing Opera-
tions and Longer Term Refinancing operations, already mentioned, the provision
of liquidity in foreign currencies.
In the red phase of the crisis, the balance sheet of the Eurosystem grows by nearly
50 per cent, to nearly 1.5 trillion, as the central bank took on itself the interme-
diation function that the impaired banking sector was not capable of carrying out
any more (Papadia 2009). In terms of composition, one sees a further increased
share of Longer Term Refinancing Operations.
In the subsequent yellow phase, the size and the composition of the balance sheet
remains largely unchanged because of the effect of the very large one year opera-
tions, while the only easily discernible change is the further reduction in the size
and share of Main Refinancing Operations. On the asset side one can also now
see the –  relatively small  – effects of the purchases of covered bonds by the
Eurosystem.
Traffic lights regulate traffic. They do not support a moral, but there is a moral
to this traffic light story: the European Central Bank took exceptional actions to
deal with an exceptional crisis, but it did not need to carry out radical changes to
the framework of its market operations, which proved robust, able to easily
accommodate exceptional measures and effectively fend the Eurosystem from
exceptional market conditions. Liquidity tensions have subsided and there is, at
least, a timing sequencing to indicate that this is because of the action of the
European Central Bank. Will the success on the liquidity front be followed by
success in the real economy? It is too early to tell, but the omens are favourable.
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5. CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT THE EU 
NEEDS AMBITIOUS PROGRESS
Freddy van den Spiegel
The cost of the worldwide financial crisis is huge. The need for a global review of
financial regulation, in order to avoid future crises is generally recognised. How-
ever, the reality is that crises can happen at any time and that regulatory reform
– no matter how efficient and necessary – will not be able to rule them out alto-
gether. As such, a debate is also needed on how to minimise the consequences of
any future crisis. This mainly relates to creating the optimal structures, instru-
ments and decision-making powers to allow efficient crisis management, in order
to prevent a crisis from acting like a virus and infecting the entire financial system.
That debate takes place on various levels: nationally, regionally – more specifi-
cally European – and globally within the G20. It is repeatedly pointed out that
financial markets are integrated worldwide and there is accordingly a need for
crisis management to be globally coordinated, even though the actual decisions
must be taken, by definition, by countries within their national legislative frame-
work. That approach creates a specific challenge for the European Union as the
European level is an intermediate one whose role in connection with crisis man-
agement is still not defined. Most telling in this regard is that the EU’s key role in
the current crisis is being played by DG Competition, even though competition is
only of secondary importance during a crisis that is potentially life-threatening to
the entire social fabric. Developing a clear framework for managing financial
crises at EU level is therefore essential, for two reasons:
– the EU strives for a completely open internal market. Every power given to a
member state to avoid or manage crises may lead to nationalistic responses
that can undermine the internal market. The idea of an open market also
features at global level, but is not such a priority there. An open internal
market is the very essence of the EU;
– the EU has political procedures at its disposal which do not exist at global
level: harmonisation of the legal framework, or transfer of political powers
to a supranational level are negotiable at EU level, but globally unfeasible to
date.
Regardless of how necessary an effective crisis management system is at EU level,
its attainment remains a delicate issue because a serious financial crisis can have
far-reaching consequences for society as a whole, not in the least because of the
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potential extent of the damage that will have to be recouped through taxes. Prag-
matic action therefore needs to be taken, making sure that the right priorities
receive the most attention. This crisis has at least highlighted a number of imped-
iments to progress, which will be dealt with below.
5.1. NEED FOR FULL HARMONISATION OF A NUMBER OF 
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY ASPECTS WITHIN 
THE EU
Full harmonisation is often the EU’s solution to promote or protect the integra-
tion of the internal market. The same applies here. Harmonisation is always a
complex political process because it involves member states amending their legis-
lative framework. In view of the versatility of crisis management, full harmonisa-
tion of all aspects is probably not feasible: after all, it affects the foundations of
a country’s entire legal system. Priorities must therefore be determined. Achieving
‘must have’ is already a challenge and ‘should have’ and ‘nice to have’ are best
left aside.
Crisis management is usually a chaotic process with constantly unexpected twists
and turns, forcing crisis managers to push the limits of legality. Some ambiguity
can help in this regard but it must at least be clear who is authorised to make
decisions and what instruments are available. The crisis has shown that decisions
which cannot be based on a clear statutory footing may give rise to a legal entan-
glement that is reported on widely by the media and potentially leads to a political
crisis. Sloppy crisis management can contribute in that way to a further erosion
of trust. A special crisis resolution system for banks is essential within this statu-
tory framework, without having to follow the normal, time-consuming legal pro-
ceedings for bankruptcy or takeover.
Creating this clear framework is the duty of the member states, but must to a
large extent be coordinated at European level, so that there is at least a viable
platform for cross-border cooperation between supervisory authorities in times
of crisis. Although full harmonisation is perhaps difficult to achieve, inconsisten-
cies in the crisis management tool box of the different member states must be
eliminated.
5.2. CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE: WHO, WHEN 
AND HOW?
Harmonising the tool box for crisis management between member states is not
enough: the discretionary decision about how and when these tools are used is as
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important. By definition, each crisis is a surprise for which there is no tailor-made
script. As such, it is impossible to organise crisis management according to strict
legislative texts because creative solutions are essential during a crisis. Crisis man-
agement in a cross-border situation is thus not obvious because the solution
deemed best for one member state is not necessarily optimal or acceptable to
other member states. The EU must therefore make every effort to avoid paralys-
ing friction among member states during a crisis. Some of the rules to be elabo-
rated include the following.
– there must be clear arrangements on crisis management among supervisory
authorities (including central banks and treasuries) of the member states in
which a specific financial group has significant activities. Those arrangements
must be made in good times and lead to binding agreements, preferably
including burden sharing. For reasons of speed, knowledge and involvement,
it indeed seems appropriate to make such arrangements multilaterally for
each financial institution among the member states concerned. EU institu-
tions should only play a facilitating role;
– it must be guaranteed that all supervisory authorities obtain the necessary
information in time during a crisis. The European Supervisory Authority
should be able to guarantee this;
– when deciding which instruments to use (guarantees, nationalisation, etc.) for
specific banks, consultation must be compulsory and member states must at
least be obliged to objectively take into account the effects of their actions on
other member states. Obviously, a burden-sharing agreement which spreads
the cost of the crisis of a bank among the member states involved would be
ideal. However, if this is not feasible, considering the consequences objec-
tively would already bring more discipline into the decision-making process;
– a clear distinction must be made with regard to cooperation depending on the
type of crisis: a crisis of one specific bank relating to an endogenous problem
requires a totally different approach to a cross-border systemic crisis. A cross-
border systemic crisis would have to be recognised formally by EU institu-
tions and lead to far stronger EU coordination.
All these elements are present to a certain degree in the proposals put forward by
the Commission regarding the new supervisory framework, but should be made
more explicit.
5.3. THE SYSTEMIC BANKING PUZZLE MUST BE RESOLVED
The debate surrounding the future of systemic banks rages on with great intensity,
but leads to disagreements and confusion. Basically, it seems to be simple: banks
that can incapacitate the financial system upon bankruptcy are defined as sys-
temic and must be subject to more stringent rules.
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The practical problems start in determining which banks are systemic: size seems
to be an obvious criterion, yet complexity and interconnectedness are just as
important. The extent to which a bank plays an irreplaceable role in one or other
essential financial infrastructure is also important. In addition, the crisis has
shown that the extent of systemic relevance also depends on timing: a crisis is
driven by mass psychology, that can sometimes cause chain reactions in case of
minor incidents. Identifying individual banks as systemic will therefore always be
controversial.
Even if the list of systemic banks is defined, the question remains as to which
specific measures to adopt. Imposing additional capital requirements is a very
drastic measure that can compromise the competitive position of systemic banks
without necessarily limiting their systemic character. Limiting permitted activities
(narrow banking) will lead to those activities being developed by other – unregu-
lated – operators, without making the system healthier.
It appears to be more appropriate to include in the capital requirements of all
banks complexity, interconnectedness and intransparency as risk factors. The
credibility of so-called contingency plans or living wills, together with a scenario
analysis and stress tests, can help in the diagnosis. Additional capital require-
ments for these risk factors will encourage simplicity and transparency as the
capital cost of complexity will automatically be taken into consideration in the
internal decision-making.
While developing the appropriate regulatory framework for systemic banks, the
EU must also take into account the specificity of its banking system compared,
for instance, to the United States: banks in the EU play a significantly greater role
in financing the real economy. The economic cost of higher capital requirements
for banks will be bigger in the EU than in the US. Furthermore, financial integra-
tion automatically means that banks within the EU engage in far more cross-
border activities. If the EU wants to continue to encourage financial integration,
it is essential that cross border banking within the EU is not considered as a factor
of complexity. Therefore it is necessary that the analysis of the complexity of
banks takes place at the EU consolidated level, involving all the supervisory
authorities concerned and under the control of the European Supervisory Author-
ities.
5.4. CONCLUSION
The experiences of this crisis clearly point to where EU framework for crisis man-
agement must be urgently improved. The conclusions are not even surprising:
selective harmonisation of the tools and powers of supervisory authorities in the
member states, stricter coordination of supervision and crisis management at EU
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level, and excluding unilateral decisions by member states. If the EU is not able
to achieve this limited agenda, the financial integration project within the EU will
logically be questioned. That would be an expensive decision, not only for the
financial sector but even more for the real economy.
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6. THE COLLAPSE OF ICELANDIC BANKS AND 
CROSS-BORDER COLLABORATION
Ingimundur Fridriksson1
I thank the organizers for inviting me to participate in this seminar to share with
you some reflections on aspects of the banking crisis in Iceland and related cross-
border issues. This session is titled Cross-border bank resolution. I will provide
some background to the Icelandic banking developments and then turn to cross
border collaboration from a broader angle than just resolution. I should mention
that I have not been involved in Iceland’s crisis management nor resolution since
early February of this year and thus do not have privilege to any information
beyond that which is publically available regarding developments since then.
Additionally, I have been employed outside Iceland since the middle of the year.
6.1. BACKGROUND
Once Iceland’s state owned banks were fully privatised after the turn of the cen-
tury, they began to expand at a rapid pace, with the primary focus outside Ice-
land. They acquired financial companies in other countries, established branches,
and expanded their operations from headquarters in Reykjavik. Their rapid
growth was facilitated by Iceland’s membership in the European Economic Area
(EEA) through which Iceland is a participant in the single market of the European
Union (EU). Accordingly, Iceland was obliged to create for its financial system a
legal and regulatory framework rooted in the directives of the EU. Operating
licences granted to Icelandic financial enterprises extended not only to Iceland but
to all other EEA states. They were accorded a ‘European passport’ and were thus
permitted to open and operate branches anywhere in the EEA. They had the same
rights and responsibilities as banks in all of the other EEA states. The Icelandic
Financial Supervisory Authority based its activities on the domestic application
of European laws, regulations and procedures. Subsidiaries were regulated and
supervised by supervisory authorities in the countries where they were located
while branches were mainly supervised from the home country.
1 Presentation prepared for a SUERF, CEPS and Belgian Financial Forum Conference on Crisis Management at
Cross-Roads held in the National Bank of Belgium in Brussels, November 16, 2009. An abbreviated oral version
was delivered at the conference. The author is a former member of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank
of Iceland. He is currently Senior Adviser in the Central Bank of Norway (Norges Bank). The content of the
presentation is completely unrelated to the author’s assignments in the Central Bank of Norway. The author is
thankful for the comments of Eiríkur Guðnason, Jón Þ. Sigurgeirsson, Lilja Alfreðsdóttir, Sigriður Logadóttir
and Tryggvi Pálsson on the draft of the presentation. The author alone is responsible for errors and views
expressed.
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The European regulatory environment was not the only factor permitting the
banks to expand as they did. Conditions in the global financial markets were
quite exceptional: Virtually inexhaustible supply of credit at interest rates lower
than they had been in a hundred years. There is a wall of money out there was
the common refrain of international bankers. To quote the Central Bank of Ice-
land’s Financial Stability report from October 2009, “the banks were participants
in a global sequence of events that were shaped by extraordinary circum-
stances”2. In their search for yield, international investors were hungry for attrac-
tive bonds, including those issued by Iceland’s banks. The banks were thoroughly
scrutinised by international credit rating agencies and their favourable ratings
greatly facilitated their foray into the bond market. In early 2007, Moody’s raised
their rating to Aaa for a while. Given their ratings, the banks had virtually unlim-
ited access to credit in the international bond markets in the period when they
grew the fastest. Their bonds became popular in various structured products.
The banks became a vital part of the national economy, their expansion and that
of other Icelandic companies garnered widespread domestic support, they offered
handsome salaries, and brought the Treasury sizeable tax revenues, directly and
indirectly. As noted by Kaarlo Jännäri, the Finnish banking supervisory expert
commissioned in 2009 to review the Icelandic regulatory framework and recom-
mend changes, “consecutive Icelandic governments with different political com-
positions – and opposition leaders as well – had underlined the importance of the
financial sector and declared their support for its continued growth. Those who
criticised the banks were not taken seriously or paid much attention. The bankers
were virtually considered national heroes; they were lionised by the media, and
the nation was proud of the banks’ success. Had the supervisory authorities tried
to intervene and forcefully tried to stop this development, they would in all prob-
ability have failed, as they lacked the legal authority to intervene. The nation, up
to its highest echelons, supported and admired the banks, and many are still in a
state of denial regarding their own part in this tragedy. The CBI and the FME
tried to raise words of caution, but it was too little and too late, and it is doubtful
whether they could have stopped these developments even if they had had the
power to do it”3.
The Icelandic banks operated in many foreign countries, mainly in the other Nor-
dic Countries, the UK and Luxembourg. By the end of 2007, the combined bal-
ance sheet total of the three largest banks had grown to the equivalent of roughly
10 times Iceland’s GDP. In 2007, the last full year of their operations, they derived
more than half of their income from operations in other countries. The largest
2 Central Bank of Iceland, Financial Stability, October 26, 2009, p. 13.
3 K. JÄNNÄRI, Report on Banking Regulation and Supervision in Iceland: past, present and future, March 30,
2009, pp. 14 and 20, respectively. Available on the website of the Icelandic Prime Minister’s Office (www.forsa-
etisraduneyti.is/media/frettir/KaarloJannari__2009.pdf).
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bank derived more than three quarters of its income abroad. The home market
had declined commensurably in significance. The share of foreign subsidiaries in
the consolidated balance sheet totals of the banks ranged from 27% to 54%, and
roughly 60% of their total loans were to foreign borrowers. No foreign banks
operated in Iceland.
Very briefly on the macro economic background, the Icelandic economy grew
rapidly before the crisis. From 2002 to 2007, real GDP grew by 31%, private
consumption by 41%, investment by 105%, and real disposable income by 50%.
Macroeconomic imbalances, which became more pronounced in this period,
originated in large scale investment in the aluminium sector and associated invest-
ment in power generation4. On top of that came sudden structural changes in the
domestic financial market, at least in part inspired by government policy5, which
substantially boosted the borrowing ability of households, reductions in taxes,
both direct and indirect, and generous wage settlements which in addition to the
tax reductions led to unprecedented increases in the disposable incomes of house-
holds. All of this led to sharply increased private consumption. Monetary policy
had since 2001 been based on an inflation targeting framework. Given insuffi-
cient support from others, both the public finances and the wage settlement side,
the monetary policy task of the Central Bank became extremely difficult, and
despite very high interest rates, serious imbalances developed, a large current
account deficit emerged and inflation rose eventually to several times the official
target. Thus, financial system weaknesses were accentuated by macro-economic
imbalances and instability. Partly, Iceland’s macroeconomic predicament
stemmed from its cyclical position being significantly out of line with other econ-
omies which, given the domestic economic policy mix, required a large interest
rate differential between Iceland and other countries.
I do not need to say much about the background to the global crisis. It came
about as a result of intensified global imbalances, the emergence of bubbles, mis-
pricing of and failures in assessing risk, lack of transparency, underestimation of
liquidity risk, greed through misplaced remuneration and incentive schemes,
insufficient attention to liquidity of markets, limitations of the global framework
in a national and cross border context; there was little impact of early warnings
in terms of action – and most early warnings were feeble anyway; the process was
a dynamic one and the lack of market transparency combined with the sudden
downgrade of credit ratings, and the US Government’s decision not to save Leh-
man Brothers led to a wide-spread breakdown of trust and a crisis of confidence
4 See for example I. FRIDRIKSSON, The Icelandic economy and financial system in April 2008, presentation at a
meeting of the Board of Directors of the Norwegian financial Supervisor, Kredittilsynet, in Reykjavik, April 24,
2008. Available on the website of the Central Bank of Iceland.
5 The decision of the government to expand the activities of the public Housing Finance Fund which enticed the
commercial banks to enter into head-on competition with the Fund. See for example Central Bank of Iceland,
Financial Stability, May 4, 2006, p. 34.
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in autumn 2008, practically shut down inter-bank money markets, thus creating
a large scale liquidity crisis6.
These were the conditions under which the global financial conditions fermented
into a poisonous brew. The Icelandic banking system expanded in this environ-
ment which shaped it, the flaws in the global system applied equally to the Ice-
landic banks as others, as developments have clearly shown. This is inter alia
borne out in the report of the Finnish banking supervisory expert already cited
when he states that “when judging the reasons for the Icelandic banking crisis and
the events leading to it, one should not forget the international setting in which it
happened and which made it possible. It would not have been possible without
the overall laxity in the global financial markets and the bubbles it produced,
which were bound to burst at some point in time. When greed gave way to fear
and the bubbles started bursting, there was no way the Icelandic banks could
have been saved. This is not to say that Icelandic banks were innocent victims of
the circumstances. They made the gravest mistakes themselves by going along
with the global euphoria and forgetting that conquering the world is not possible
without a strong home base and own resources”7.
Much has been written about the Icelandic financial system, its expansion after
privatisation and then its subsequent collapse8. The banks depended heavily on
easy access to the global bond markets and, aided by favourable credit ratings,
tapped them for significant amounts. Following a period of critical international
attention and scrutiny in the first half of 2006, which resulted in tighter access to
credit, and urgings of rating agencies and various analysts that they increase the
relative share of deposits on the liabilities side of their balance sheets, they
embarked upon aggressive retail deposit collection in other countries, particularly
in the UK, mainly through internet accounts booked in branches but also in sub-
sidiaries.
In its concluding statement after the 2007 Article IV Consultation, the IMF mis-
sion stated the following: “The financial system withstood the market stress in
early-2006 admirably, but new risks may be emerging. Banks have taken impor-
tant steps over the past year to reduce vulnerabilities and increase resilience.
Short-term liquidity management has been strengthened. Ownership structures
have been made more transparent with sell-down of some cross-shareholdings,
which is important for maintaining investor confidence. As banks continue to
6 See for example the Report of the high-level group on financial supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacques de
Larosière, Brussels, February 25, 2009, pp. 7-12.
7 K. JÄNNÄRI, o.c., pp. 19-20.
8 See inter alia Central Bank of Iceland: Financial Stability 2009, o.c., as well as earlier issues; K. JÄNNÄRI, o.c.;
IMF, Staff Report on Iceland’s Request for Stand-by Arrangement, Washington, November 15, 2008; I. FRID-
RIKSSON, The banking crisis in Iceland in 2008, presentation dated February 6, 2009; available on the website
of the Central Bank of Iceland (www.sedlabanki.is) and I. FRIDRIKSSON, The banking crisis in Iceland: The rise,
fall and restructuring of Iceland’s financial institutions, presentation at a seminar on Financial Rehabilitation
arranged by Arctic Securities in Oslo June 25, 2009, unpublished but available on request from the author.
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expand rapidly and the complexity of their operations increases, risk manage-
ment practices must develop and improve commensurably”9.
After the temporary setbacks in the first half of 2006, the banks were able to tap
bond markets anew on the basis of their ratings10, albeit probably at a premium
compared to their rating. They became successful in attracting retail deposits by
offering favourable terms and they strengthened their capital and liquidity posi-
tions.
Following the swift turn in the global financial markets in mid 2007, the access
of the banks to the bond markets virtually closed. Their CDS spreads rose sharply
as doubts seemed to grow about their future viability, partly at least due to the
large refinancing of outstanding debt that waited on the horizon, and apparent
uncertainty about one of the banks’ ability to consummate its latest acquisition
of a foreign bank. Subsequently, for two of the banks, retail deposits became an
increasingly important source of liquidity while the third primarily securitised
and liquidated assets. Acquisition plans were soon abolished or cancelled and all
the banks began to downsize in increasingly strained markets. Moreover, with the
widespread crisis of confidence in international markets and interbank markets
more or less dysfunctional, like other banks, the Icelandic banks increasingly
resorted to central bank financing.
By 2008, the banks had outgrown the Central Bank’s ability to realistically serve
as a lender of last resort. Their favourable credit ratings were at least partly the
result of the ratings agencies’ assessment that the government would support the
banks as needed and have the ability to do that11. Neither the Treasury nor the
Central Bank had ever given such guarantees or declarations to this effect to agen-
cies responsible for Iceland’s sovereign and banking sector ratings, as explicitly
stated for example in the Bank’s Financial Stability in 200712.
In late summer 2008, the subsidiarisation of an Icelandic bank branch in London
was under preparation and expected to be concluded before the end of the year,
plans were for the same elsewhere at the beginning of 2009, work was apparently
progressing reasonably well in at least two of the banks in attracting new inter-
national equity investors, thus widening and strengthening the ownership base,
large asset sales were in the pipeline, serious consideration had started in at least
one of the banks on possibly moving headquarters to another country, and so on.
9 IMF, Iceland-2007 Article IV Consultation, Concluding Statement, June 11, 2007. Available on the websites of
the IMF and the Central Bank of Iceland.
10 Following a rise in their CDS spreads at the end of 2005 and in early 2006, the banks shifted their funding to
new markets, in particular in the US.
11 See for example Moody’s Global Sovereign Special Comment: Iceland’s Aaa Ratings at a Crossroads, January
2008.
12 Central Bank of Iceland, Financial Stability, April 25, 2007, p. 46.
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Then came September and the collapse of Lehman Brothers. At the end of Sep-
tember and in early October, the situation in the international markets was
extremely precarious. Many banks teetered on the brink of disaster, among them
large banks in Europe, which required extraordinary governmental support13.
Global financial markets were essentially frozen, liquidity had evaporated, assets
could not be sold and credit ratings were being downgraded, potentially activat-
ing repayment triggers in various financial contracts. “With the collapse of Leh-
man Brothers, uncertainty turned to outright panic, and economic activity started
to collapse”14. The Icelandic banks crumbled in early October, entailing the col-
lapse of nine tenths of the banking system. It thus became a financial crisis of
extraordinary proportions; a systemic collapse requiring a response commensu-
rate to the task at hand. The Parliament passed emergency legislation which ena-
bled the government to respond promptly. The first priority was to ensure con-
tinued and uninterrupted functioning of domestic banking operations and pre-
venting a complete collapse of confidence.
Had Lehman not failed, it is difficult to say what might have happened. One may
as a minimum think that the collapse of the Icelandic banks would at least have
been delayed and that the initiatives under way at the end of the summer would
have softened the blow if not ensured continued viability of the banks. That
would of course have depended on how promptly they and subsequent measures
had progressed and on how the global markets had evolved if Lehman had not
collapsed.
It has also been suggested by some observers that perhaps it might have been
possible to get authorities in other countries to pressure their banks to take over
one or two of the Icelandic banks in early October. It is unlikely that this was a
realistic option. Everyone was occupied with saving their own banks, and I doubt
that anyone would have seen it in his own interest or that of his domestic banks
to extend a helping hand to Icelandic banks at that time.
The response of the Icelandic authorities to developments in the period until
October 2008 is not the subject of this presentation. It is documented else-
where15. Very briefly, the authorities had activated and intensified their contin-
gency mechanisms well before the collapse and were at a very heightened level of
alert in 2008.
13 In an interview with the BBC, Bank of England Governor Mervyn King said: “Two of our major banks which
had had difficulty in obtaining funding could raise money only for one week then only for one day, and then on
that Monday and Tuesday <October 6 and 7> it was not possible even to be confident that they could get to the
end of the day.” Reported on Bloomberg.com, September 24, 2009.
14 D. STRAUSS-KAHN, Economic Stability, Economic Cooperation, and Peace – the Role of the IMF, speech in
Oslo, October 23, 2009.
15 See for example Central Bank of Iceland, Financial Stability 2009, o.c.; I. FRIDRIKSSON, The banking crisis in
Iceland: The rise, fall and restructuring of Iceland’s financial institutions, o.c. and K. JÄNNÄRI, o.c.
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As for asset quality in the Icelandic banks, the responsibility of management and
the role played by principal shareholders, the jury is still out. Indications have
emerged of questionable practices and potential legal offences in the banks that
are now the subject of investigation by a special prosecutor. Other pertinent issues
may be addressed by the Special Parliamentary Investigative Commission due to
deliver its report in early 2010.
In retrospect, and as global financial markets evolved, it is clear that the Icelandic
banks had become too large; they did not have a sufficiently strong home base.
Moreover, their rapid growth and relative size rendered them sensitive to adverse
developments in global financial markets. The Icelandic Government did not
have the financial means to rescue them in the manner which other governments
have so far been able to with their respective banks. Their collapse might not have
been avoided, but the question remains whether better international collabora-
tion both prior and after their collapse might have led to lesser overall damage or
losses than seems likely to become the result. I say overall losses since indications
are that some may have made strong gains from the collapse of the banks and the
subsequent liquidation of their assets.
6.2. CROSS-BORDER COLLABORATION
As mentioned, Iceland is a member of the EEA and thus belongs to the single
market of the EU which entails that Iceland had adopted the EU financial market
legal and regulatory framework. Through its membership in the EEA, Iceland had
participated and continues to participate in various EU committees, including the
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and the Banking Supervi-
sory Committee (BSC), and followed the cross border crisis management prepar-
atory work in the EU. In mid 2008, Iceland along with Norway, declared its
interest in joining the EU MoU on cross-border financial crisis situations which
had been signed by the EU countries earlier in the year and the EEA countries that
are not members of the EU were invited to join.
The five Nordic central banks signed an MoU in 2003 on the management of a
financial crisis in banks with cross-border establishments16 setting out how they
would cooperate among themselves in the case of a liquidity shortfall in an insti-
tution with cross-border operations. The MoU replaced swap lines among the
Nordic central banks that had a long history but were at the time considered to
have run their course.
In addition to the MoU of 2003, the Nordic central banks have a long history of
comprehensive and fruitful collaboration in practically all areas of their activities,
16 Dated June 2003 and available on the websites of all the Nordic central banks.
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perhaps most intensely in recent years in the field of financial stability. In Septem-
ber 2007, there was a path-breaking crisis management exercise in the Nordic
and Baltic countries spanning three days and involving finance ministries, finan-
cial supervisory authorities and central banks in all the Nordic countries and the
central banks in the Baltic countries, altogether 18 institutions in eight coun-
tries17.
The Icelandic Supervisory Authority participated in international cooperation of
supervisory authorities and cooperated with its sister institutions in other coun-
tries. It had signed MoUs with several of them and was in 2008 preparing to set
up supervisory colleges with some of them.
The increasingly tight global financial markets and intensifying liquidity difficul-
ties in 2007 and 2008 warranted a response entailing cooperation across borders.
In the first half of 2008, the Central Bank of Iceland sought cooperation with
other central banks and the BIS. This was a part of the Bank’s contingency work
at that time. In particular, it requested swap arrangements with other central
banks, the Nordic ones, the Bank of England, the ECB, the US Federal Reserve,
and later the Bank of Japan. It also requested a credit line with the BIS. Among
the motivations behind the Icelandic authorities’ request for increased collabora-
tion and support was that the operations of the Icelandic banks were becoming
ever more important in the financial systems of other countries. Cross-border
collaboration was thus felt not only to be in Iceland’s interest, but also that of the
other countries, i.e. it was not only in Iceland’s interest to enhance confidence in
the ability of Iceland to effectively respond to developments.
Initially, the response from some of the other central banks was rather favourable,
even to the extent that work had commenced in April in at least two of them on
drafting the necessary documentation. Some requested that the IMF assess the
situation in Iceland and specifically that of the banks. That was done promptly in
early April 2008 and the IMF’s assessment made available to the Governors of
the central banks that had been contacted along with material specifically
requested from the Icelandic central bank. Broadly, the conclusion of the IMF was
that the position of the Icelandic banks was tight but manageable and it endorsed
the strategy of the Icelandic authorities, i.e. to negotiate swap agreements with
other central banks in order to enhance confidence and allow the government to
subsequently tap the international capital market to further strengthen its exter-
nal liquidity position. Financial stability experts from the Swedish central bank
also visited Iceland in April (and again in September) to assess the position of the
banks. Their conclusions were broadly similar to those of the IMF. In May the
Icelandic authorities requested a follow-up FSAP exercise from the IMF which
17 See for example Central Bank of Iceland, Financial Stability 2008, pp. 46-47.
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was promptly conducted in June with the report being published later in the
year18.
After the relatively promising initial responses from some of the central banks,
however, something happened in the latter half of April and into early May which
caused some of them to retract. In the end, only three Nordic central banks, the
Danish, Norwegian and Swedish ones, agreed to set up swap arrangements with
the Central Bank of Iceland (the Bank of Finland being a euro area central bank
could not participate). They were concluded in May. No drawings were made
until October 2008, after the collapse, when partial drawings were made under
two of the arrangements amounting to just over a quarter of the total size of the
arrangements. The three arrangements were renewed after the adoption of an
IMF program in November and partial drawings made under all of them in
December 2008, amounting to 30% of their overall size. Further drawings have
not been made.
Evident during this period was increasing collaboration among other central
banks on their position vis-a-vis Iceland from late April 2008. Some of the major
banks suggested at the time that an IMF program would be a precondition for
their consideration of a swap arrangement with the Icelandic central bank. An
example of their contacts is that one central bank’s insistence on an IMF program
as a condition for potential support was quickly corrected by another central
bank explaining that an assessment by the IMF would be sufficient for both of
them, of the type undertaken in April, involving a brief visit by IMF experts to
Iceland. All of them appeared to share the view that the Icelandic banks had
become too big and needed to be downsized, which was becoming rapidly more
problematic in difficult markets. It was also suggested that to be effective, the
amount of the swap arrangements would have to be larger than was possible to
commit.
Later in the year, the Icelandic government initiated contacts with the Russian
authorities concerning potential financing and received in due course a relatively
favourable initial response. In the end, that did not result in agreement.
In late September, in a period of acute US dollar shortage in international markets
and shortly before the collapse of the Icelandic banks, the US Federal Reserve
made swap arrangements (largely at its own initiative) with several central banks
outside the major industrial countries, including three Nordic ones. Iceland’s sub-
sequent request for a similar agreement was turned down twice. It was inferred
inter alia that an IMF program would be a precondition for the Fed to consider
the matter. Following the collapse of the banks, the Icelandic government soon
agreed with the IMF on a Stand-By Arrangement. Expectations that the IMF pro-
18 IMF, Iceland: Financial System Stability Assessment – Update, Washington, December 8, 2008. The IMF had
also conducted an FSAP in Iceland 2000/2001 and a follow-up in 2003.
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gram would allow for financing arrangements with other countries and central
banks which had earlier made an IMF program a precondition, evaporated
quickly. Other countries, except notably the Nordic ones, had been unresponsive
to Iceland’s requests for assistance earlier in the year and they continued to be
unresponsive after the collapse and the efforts to gain control of developments
with the assistance of the IMF, including the resolution of the old banks, and the
restoration of a new and viable banking system. In addition to the financial com-
mitments from the Nordic countries, Poland and the Faeroe Islands offered loans
to Iceland at their own respective initiatives, and agreements were concluded with
both.
The Icelandic banks operated in many countries. One of them, Kaupthing, is
taken as a case study in a recent Basel Committee Consultative Paper which states
that Kaupthing was active through branches and subsidiaries in thirteen jurisdic-
tions19. One of the issues that remains to be studied after the collapse of the banks
is the response of the authorities in the countries where they operated. A tentative
observation, and one yet to be confirmed by closer study, is that despite all the
talk about cross border cooperation in the resolution of financial crises in order
inter alia to minimize or contain the resulting damage or losses, it was often
national considerations that prevailed in the approach of individual authorities.
Very damaging was the decision of the UK authorities on October 8, 2008 to issue
a freezing order on Landsbanki under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security
Act – an order that originally also referred to the Icelandic government, Central
Bank, and Financial Supervisory Authority20. No bank wants to run afoul of anti-
terrorist legislation and, needless to say, there were serious disruptions in the flow
of payments through what had been routine channels to Iceland, including ordi-
nary transfers to the Central Bank. Others than Landsbanki were soon removed
from the freezing order, but the damage was done. It required extraordinary inter-
ventions over an extended period from the Central Bank with other central
banks, supervisory authorities and individual banks to unfreeze – or thaw – pay-
ments, even individual ones, destined for Iceland21. Landsbanki remained subject
to the freezing order and on the sanctions list until June of 2009, i.e. for more
than eight months, in the company of the likes of Al-Qaida and the Taliban and
others.
Questions have also been raised about the actions in various other countries to
liquidate assets of the Icelandic banks in their jurisdictions. This was referred to
in the Governor’s Foreword to the Central Bank of Iceland’s recently released
19 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-
Border-bank Resolution Group, BIS, September 2009, pp. 12-13.
20 HM Treasury, London (www.hm-treasury.gov.uk); Financial Sanctions Notice: The Landsbanki Freezing Order,
October 8, 2008.
21 For further elaboration see Central Bank of Iceland: Financial Stability 2009 – Payments intermediation during
the financial crisis, pp. 22-37.
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Financial Stability 2009 where he stated inter alia that “rescue efforts were also
carried out in Iceland in connection with the banks’ failure. They were somewhat
different in nature, however, as the Icelandic authorities did not have the strength
to protect the banks on their own, and international support was not forthcom-
ing, even though it could be argued that the three banks concerned were system-
ically important because of the possibility of a domino effect throughout North-
ern Europe in the event of their collapse. On the contrary: the response to Ice-
land’s crisis was characterised by ring-fencing and hostility, yet it is well known
that such an approach creates a worse outcome in the aggregate”22.
Informal information gathering, mainly from contacts directly involved in the
resolution process, revealed that, generally, the authorities in most countries
seemed to give little thought to the interests of Iceland. Nevertheless, the
responses of the authorities in individual countries differed. In some countries,
the authorities appear to have been very anxious to liquidate the assets of Icelan-
dic banks quickly. In these countries, assets were sold at fire sale prices and in all
likelihood yielded considerably less than they would have if the process had been
more composed. In these countries, there appeared to be limited interest in
attempting to minimize the losses of the Icelandic banks. Creditors sometimes
confiscated collaterals and sold at fire sale prices. In isolated cases, those involved
in the administration of the failed banks managed to stop large asset sales at the
last minute and in these cases, the value of the respective assets is today many
times that which they would have been sold for a year ago. In one instance, it was
reported that within weeks of an important asset sale the buyer booked the value
of his new asset at up to ten-fold the purchase price. It may have risen signifi-
cantly since.
In other countries, the process was more orderly; the authorities or banks pro-
vided short term financing in order to allow for a prompt settlement of certain
claims, particularly deposits, and there were no or hardly any untimely asset
sales. In these cases, there is no doubt that the assets of the banks will yield much
more than the fire sale prices available in the immediate aftermath of the collapse
of the banks. In these cases, cooperation across borders seems to have been
smooth.
In most cases, the overriding concern of the different authorities appeared to be
to protect deposits, in branches and subsidiaries alike; they obviously had priority
over everything else. The concern for the importance of protecting deposits seems
also to have been reflected in a recent court decision in the UK23.
22 M. GUDMUNDSSON, Rebuilding after the financial crisis; Foreword to the Central Bank of Iceland’s Financial
Stability 2009, October 26, 2009, p. 4.
23 England and Wales High Court Decisions Case No: CO/129/2009; The Queen (on the application of Kaupthing
Bank hf) and H.M. Treasury, October 20, 2009.
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Apparently, the authorities in other countries rarely initiated contacts with those
involved in the resolution of the banks in Iceland. The initiative generally had to
come from Iceland. In some cases, however, the authorities in other countries
initiated contacts after unsuccessful attempts to immediately liquidate assets.
There may not have been any direct cooperation among the different countries in
how they treated the assets of the Icelandic banks and their liquidation in their
respective territories, but the impression among those engaged in the resolution
of the banks is that the different authorities knew very well what others were
doing.
From the limited and informal information that I have cited, it can be at least
tentatively concluded that there seems to have been relatively limited cooperation
with Iceland, and that in at least some cases, assets of the Icelandic banks were
sold at a very low price under considerable pressure from the local authorities.
There is also evidence of ring-fencing of the assets of the banks by the various
authorities, even before the collapse of the Icelandic banks in October and the
subsequent collapse of some much smaller institutions in March 2009. Decisions
on the liquidation of assets seem mainly to have been taken on the basis of
national interests or local concerns and not with a view to limiting overall loss.
Thus, it seems inevitable that the cost or losses stemming from the collapse of the
Icelandic banks will in the end be greater than they needed to be and, perhaps in
particular, they will be more costly for Iceland. This, however, remains to be thor-
oughly studied.
I referred earlier to the Nordic-Baltic crisis management exercise. Cross-border
MoUs were generally not remembered in the exercise and only one country, Ice-
land, used the recommended analytical tool, the systemic assessment heat map.
Possibly this experience was reflected in real time responses in Europe in 2008.
Not only was this possibly the case, but when, in contacts in 2008, the authorities
in some countries were reminded of obligations under EU directives, their
response was essentially that they could not care less if their actions might be at
variance with them. Iceland could of course lodge a complaint with the appropri-
ate authority, but judgment would not be handed down for several years and was
of no concern in 2008. Everything was permissible in the time of great tensions.
The collapse of the banks in October 2008 unveiled flaws in the European regu-
latory system and will, in conjunction with other events in Europe and elsewhere,
lead to changes. This was specifically referred to both in the report of the de
Larosière Group24 and in the Turner Review25. Both referred to passporting rights
and both to failures in cross-border banking supervision, regulation and cooper-
24 Report of the de Larosière Group, o.c.
25 The Turner Review, “A regulatory response to the global banking crisis”, Financial Services Authority, London,
March 2009.
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ation and in deposit guarantee regulation: “The crisis has demonstrated that the
current organization of DGSs in the Member States was a major weakness in the
EU banking regulatory framework”26. Again, I refer to the Governor of the Cen-
tral Bank of Iceland’s Foreword in the Bank’s Financial Stability 2009 issued late
last month where he stated that “the crisis revealed clearly the contradiction
between the internationalisation of finance, on the one hand, and national super-
vision and safety nets, on the other. The problem was particularly prominent in
the case of the EEA regulatory framework, which had gone farther in lifting
restrictions on cross-border banking activities than was the case in many other
parts of the world”27.
In a paper from June 2009, Garcia, Lastra and Nieto refer to studies which argue
that insolvent banks are resolved efficiently when the sum of their aggregate
credit and liquidity losses is at or close to zero and that the public policy objective
of resolving banks should be to reduce costs, both public and private28. They call
attention to various deficiencies in the European regulatory framework. In many
areas it differs in important respects among individual countries. “The strong
national orientation of the EU safety net suggests that in the face of a cross-border
crisis, national authorities would have a strong tendency to put their own
national interests first since the present structure of supervision, deposit insurance
coverage and bank resolution largely follows the national legal structure of bank-
ing groups. The lack of incentives to cooperate (including sharing of information)
has been highlighted by a number of authors...”29. In their conclusions they state
that “the financial crisis is highlighting the importance of an integrated approach
to the EU safety net: prudential supervision, deposit insurance, reorganization
and winding up and lender of last resort”30.
The EU directive on deposit guarantee schemes obliges the member states to set
up a guarantee scheme. The schemes do not have to be pre-funded and many are
not. The directive apparently does not directly address the issue of government
responsibility for the schemes’ commitments, and not in the event of a system-
wide shock. “It is accepted that deposit guarantee systems are neither meant nor
able to deal with systemic banking crises...”31. The Icelandic system fulfilled the
requirements of the directive. In Iceland, as in many other countries, the scheme
is a private foundation, with limited capital, and with an obligation for the banks
to come up with money if needed.
26 Report of the de Larosière Group, o.c., p. 34.
27 M. GUDMUNDSSON, o.c., p. 4.
28 G. G.H. GARCIA, R. M. LASTRA and M. NIETO, “Bankruptcy and reorganization procedures for cross-border
banks in the EU – towards and integrated approach to the reform of the EU safety net”, Journal of Financial
Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2009, pp. 246-247.
29 G. G.H. GARCIA, R. M. LASTRA and M. NIETO, o.c., pp. 252-253.
30 G. G.H. GARCIA, R. M. LASTRA and M. NIETO, o.c., p. 259.
31 Banque de France, The functions and organization of deposit guarantee schemes: the French experience,
Commisions bancaire 2000 Annual report (June 2001), pp. 179-180.
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Garcia, Lastra and Nieto find various deficiencies in European Commission pro-
posals to revise the deposit insurance framework and point out among other
things that they make no attempt to ensure adequate funding in a crisis and that
they make no attempt to harmonize the different roles of the deposit guarantee
schemes. “Two thirds of EU deposit insurance schemes have very limited roles...
and they lack the authority, structure and resources to resolve banks in crisis”32.
The settlement of deposit related claims in foreign branches of Icelandic banks
proved in some cases to be a particularly difficult aspect of the collapse of the
banks. An agreement was reached with the UK and Dutch authorities in June
2009 (under civil law as opposed to international law) on the settlement of
deposit claims in Icelandic bank branches in the UK and the Netherlands, pre-
sumably within the existing parameters of EU deposit guarantee directives, but
with the Icelandic government having to guarantee settlement by the Icelandic
deposit guarantee fund. This agreement is notable as it means that not only was
Iceland obliged to set up a deposit insurance scheme on the basis of the directive,
but under the agreement with the Dutch and the UK authorities it had to provide
a government guarantee on the scheme’s commitments as well, even in a systemic
crisis. The chairman of the Icelandic negotiating committee said in an interview
following the completion of the agreement in June that had it not been made, the
entire system of deposit insurance in Europe might have collapsed33.
The issue is extremely contentious in Iceland and Parliament, during its debate on
the necessary supporting legislation, set additional conditions which led to fur-
ther negotiations with the Dutch and the British governments and a subsequent
amended agreement in mid-October. In it, Iceland reaffirms its binding guarantee
of the obligations of the Icelandic Deposit Guarantee Fund to compensate UK
and Dutch Icesave depositors, but without admitting any pre-existing legal obli-
gation to provide that support.
It might also be noted that reviews under Iceland’s IMF Stand-By Arrangement
were held up because of opposition within the Executive Board to its endorse-
ment while the issue of the deposit guarantees remained unsettled. Thus, the IMF
became in a way an instrument in bringing about the deposit guarantee settlement
with the UK and Dutch governments. The first review which was initially sched-
uled for February of 2009 was not completed until late October, eight months
behind schedule. The recent agreement with the Dutch and the UK authorities
cleared the way for the completion of the review, as confirmed in statements from
the Icelandic government. Virtually all other external financing was contingent
upon the completion of the IMF review, which was understandable in itself, so no
disbursements took place from any source while the deposit guarantee matter
32 G. G.H. GARCIA, R. M. LASTRA and M. NIETO, o.c., p. 258.
33 The Icelandic daily newspaper Morgunbladid, June 8, 2009.
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remained unsolved with the only and notable exceptions of the Polish and Fae-
roese loans and that partial drawings under the swap arrangements between the
Icelandic Central Bank and three Nordic central banks were regularly renewed on
rollover dates.
6.3. CONCLUSION
The collapse of the Icelandic banks in October 2008 entailed a financial crisis of
extraordinary proportions. Its seeds were sown in the period of the very rapid
growth of the banks in exceptional conditions in global financial markets and
within the European financial market framework. These seeds grew alarmingly
in the crisis which engulfed the international financial system after the middle of
2007 and climaxed in late September 2008. In retrospect, the Icelandic crisis
might possibly have been averted, or at least softened, but – even with the benefit
of hindsight – it is not clear what exactly the authorities should have done at any
particular moment, other than to delay or restrict at the outset the implementa-
tion of EU/EEA financial market laws and regulation. It is debatable whether that
would have been politically feasible at the time or in line with obligations under
the EEA agreement. Radically downsizing the banks under the increasingly diffi-
cult global financial market conditions of 2007 and particularly 2008 would have
been problematic at best. Developments have shown that within the EEA frame-
work, it is necessary to have the means to put breaks on expansion and ceilings
on relative size of banks. Small countries will necessarily have to restrain their
financial systems, and that is not just a lesson for Iceland. As far as the Icelandic
banks themselves are concerned, they seem to have been overambitious in their
expansionary policies, too aggressive and too willing to take risks and they
became more sensitive than many other banks to adverse developments in global
financial markets. Subsequent to their fall, information has also emerged indicat-
ing questionable practices in the banks, even illegal activities.
The banking crisis called for cross-border cooperation, not just after the collapse
of the banks but earlier as well. The picture which I have drawn is one of insuffi-
cient or unsuccessful cross-border collaboration in the face of crisis. Iceland
found it difficult to forge alliances in the period before the collapse of the banks,
and in the resolution of the banks, cross-border cooperation appears to have been
limited, despite noble intentions. The liquidation of the assets of Icelandic banks
in other countries appears in some cases to have taken place at fire sale prices,
much below true value, and below what the assets would have commanded if the
process had been composed in all the countries concerned. The authorities in
some of the countries proceeded without consulting those in Iceland concerned
with the administration of the failed banks. And, there were instances of very
damaging responses to the collapse.
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It might not have been possible to save the Icelandic banks, but the end result may
entail greater overall loss than was necessary.
I have given you a perspective of the cross-border collaboration efforts as viewed
from the Icelandic vantage point, particularly the Central Bank. I am sure that
others have their own story to tell.
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7. IMPROVING CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION 
IN EUROPE: A FOCUS ON BURDEN-SHARING
Peter Praet and Gregory Nguyen
7.1. INTRODUCTION
Concrete plans to strengthen the European framework for crisis prevention are
currently being discussed, with the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board
and the European Supervisory Authorities among the key outcomes so far. How-
ever, even the best crisis prevention structure is no guarantee against a crisis,
which suggests that Europe also needs to reinforce its crisis management frame-
work. This is all the more important since the current crisis may prompt national
authorities to try to limit future risks arising from banks’ cross-border activities,
and this may lead to regulations that ultimately create what the financial services
industry calls fragmentation risk (see, for example, Institute of International
Finance, 2009).
Although it possibly makes each domestic financial system individually safer, the
industry argues that such segmentation could also be costly as it would limit the
potential benefits of financial market integration in Europe. The European model
of integration is based on the single passport, thanks to which financial institu-
tions have the freedom to determine where they want to be established, and under
which legal form. Over time, many financial institutions have expanded their
operations across national borders, through branches and subsidiaries. Despite
the transnational feature of these financial institutions, and the fact that they
were supervised by different domestic authorities, these institutions were able to
develop as a group, rather than as a collection of individual entities, partly thanks
to favorable treatment by supervisory authorities. For instance, many of them
were allowed to adopt an integrated approach where some key functions
– including risk and liquidity management, back office, IT, etc. – are centralised.
In parallel, large cross-border banks have often benefited from lighter capital
requirements thanks to the recognition of cross-border and cross-activity diversi-
fication effects. In addition, the composition of boards of directors of subsidiar-
ies, which were often composed almost exclusively of representatives from the
group, gave the impression that the interests of these subsidiaries and of their
group were fungible.
The swing of the pendulum, triggered by the financial crisis which clearly fuelled
the tension between the existence of cross-border banks on the one hand and the
attribution of crisis management responsibilities to national authorities on the
SUERF2010.book  Page 73  Monday, March 22, 2010  3:04 PM74 CRISIS MANAGEMENT AT CROSS-ROADS
larcier
other hand, may question the sustainability of this business model in future. If the
benefits associated with this business model are judged substantial enough to be
preserved, then the alternative left to authorities is to better coordinate preven-
tion and crisis management policies, at EU level, rather than retreating into
domestic interests.
In that context, the Ecofin Roadmap has singled out as one of its priorities the
strengthening of the EU-wide crisis resolution framework. It provides for
enhanced policy coordination between authorities responsible for crisis manage-
ment in Europe and development of procedures for common approaches to solv-
ing crises. However, authorities may lack the incentives to cooperate in crisis res-
olution. There is thus a need to investigate, in parallel, ways to reconcile mis-
aligned interests – including burden-sharing.
Section 2 of this short paper first suggests some avenues for reinforcing the crisis
resolution framework in Europe. One of them is the convergence of authorities’
toolkits, which may be a precondition for burden-sharing1. The other sections
focus on burden-sharing mechanisms and on the impact they could have in the
functioning of a cross-border crisis framework. Section 3 clarifies the different
objectives that a burden-sharing mechanism could pursue. Indeed, it is difficult to
define a burden-sharing mechanism without first determining its objective. Clar-
ifying this objective is by no means a trivial task, as it may require making a
choice between several potential goals that may be mutually exclusive. Section 4
discusses the ex ante vs. ex post distinction and argues that a burden-sharing
mechanism is never entirely ex ante or ex post. It is important to determine which
features can be determined in advance and which can not, such as the final cost
allocation. In addition, the section argues that, given the uncertainty associated
with any crisis episode, a burden-sharing mechanism cannot be too prescriptive.
Section 5 lists some pragmatic steps that could be investigated to facilitate cross-
border crisis management and burden-sharing negotiations. A key proposal in
this respect would be to appoint a third party authority that would be involved
in the negotiations, as an observer, a facilitator or even as a mediator. This author-
ity would represent the collective interest, and would be there to reduce the risk
of authorities acting non-cooperatively, as this could generate negative externali-
ties. Finally, section 6 concludes.
1 See also Nguyen (2008) or Praet and Nguyen (2008) for a discussion of preconditions for burden-sharing
agreements.
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7.2. GENERAL APPROACH: STRENGTHENING THE 
RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
In response to the crisis, authorities in Europe have initiated substantial reforms
to strengthen simultaneously the three pillars of financial stability, namely sur-
veillance, crisis prevention and crisis management. Given their interrelationship
with crisis management, initiatives aiming at strengthening the surveillance or the
crisis prevention frameworks cannot be ignored. For instance, any attempt to
alter the existing balance between the rights and duties of home and host author-
ities will not only have an impact on how supervisory authorities cooperate in
normal times, but also on their incentives in times of crisis. Similarly, because they
pave the way for an orderly exit in times of crisis, initiatives relating to living wills
drawn up by banks definitely influence the crisis management framework. Living
wills aim at determining in normal times not only which actions large and com-
plex financial institutions can take if they face a major crisis but also how the
company can be wound up if these actions are not successful (see e.g. FSA, 2009).
This would enable either a private sector solution to be found or to liquidate the
ailing company in an orderly way.
However, in order to be credible, plans to wind up cross-border institutions will
inevitably have to address the problems resulting from the different powers that
each national authority has. Indeed, there is currently no single regime in Europe
to wind up a cross-border institution and, in addition, each domestic authority
has a different toolbox. Some convergence of authorities’ powers may be required
to make sure that they can act quickly and decisively, without running the risk of
a group solution being blocked because one particular authority might lack the
legal power to implement it.
The ideal toolkit should be based on a gradual approach. Its primary objective
would be to allow the implementation of a private sector solution. Authorities
should have the capacity to act as a broker to facilitate such a solution, without
being exposed to any legal uncertainty. When a private sector solution can not be
found, authorities should have the capacity to intervene more radically in order
to preserve the stability of the financial system. An orderly crisis resolution would
require authorities to be able to act along four different lines:
– control of the institution: authorities should be able to seize an ailing institu-
tion or to temporarily take control of it, either to facilitate a subsequent
merger or an acquisition by a private sector participant or to momentarily
nationalise the bank in order to restructure it;
– structure of the liabilities: authorities should be able to restructure liabilities,
so as to ensure that equity holders, as well as investors holding subordinated
and hybrid capital do bear some of the costs of the rescue operation. Purchase
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and assumption transactions (see, e.g., FDIC, 1998)2, where part of the assets
of an ailing bank are transferred to a healthy counterpart, together with a
share of its insured deposits, also require authorities to be able to modify the
structure of banks’ liabilities;
– structure of the assets: authorities should also be able to restructure the assets
side of a bank. This may be required if, for instance, authorities want to trans-
fer some activities to a good bank, whose objective would be to ensure the
continuity of systemically important operations. Alternatively, authorities
may also want to transfer illiquid or risky assets to a separate vehicle (bad
bank) to isolate problematic assets from the rest of the structure;
– definition of strategy: throughout the rescue operation, authorities may want
to influence the strategy of an institution, its future risk appetite, should be
able to close the non-viable parts of the business and engage in a profound
restructuring.
Obviously, the exercise of such powers should be severely restricted, and subject
to certain conditions. The fulfilling of these conditions should, however, not
become a source of legal uncertainty. One condition, for instance, should be that
the institution requiring aid presents some systemic risk. However, the difficulty
of distinguishing between what is systemic and what is not – especially as the
systemic nature of an institution may very well be context-dependent – may con-
stitute a difficulty that will need to be overcome. Secondly, the threshold at which
authorities are allowed to resort to these special powers should also be clearly
defined. The difficulty is to find a balance between type 1 error (authorities inter-
vene too early in a still sound institution) and type 2 error (authorities do not
intervene as early as they should and consequently the cost of the crisis increases).
Aligning authorities’ powers would ensure that they are all able to intervene in
the same way to implement a group-based solution. However, this does not nec-
essarily ensure that authorities will apply the same treatment to all groups pre-
senting similar problems. That is why this levelling of powers should also be
backed up by a strong cross-border coordination framework at the European
level, that would reduce the risk of creating distortions in the level playing field.
7.3. DETERMINING THE OBJECTIVE OF THE BURDEN-
SHARING MECHANISM
A special dimension in cross-border crisis management is the fact that the costs
of the rescue may be borne by different authorities/countries. How to share this
burden is a key question that needs to be addressed. The debates on burden-
2 A Purchase and Assumption Transaction is one in which part of the assets of the ailing bank are sold to a healthy
institution which in parallel also assumes some of its liabilities, such as insured deposits.
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sharing have sometimes been passionate. There are many reasons why the discus-
sion of burden sharing has been difficult in the past. They include for instance the
fiscal nature of burden sharing agreements or the impact of these agreements on
moral hazard. On the latter point, the first thing to note is that the current crisis
management framework – in which the bail out of cross-border banks may some-
times be the only credible option – is already a source of moral hazard. Tackling
issues that make cross-border bank resolution more difficult, as suggested in sec-
tion 2, would contribute to reduce moral hazard. Secondly, the burden sharing is
not a commitment to intervene in a troubled bank or to bail out its shareholders
and uninsured creditors and in that sense it preserves the ambiguity on when and
how states would intervene to rescue an ailing institution. Finally, the burden
sharing agreement should be seen in a process in which authorities do ex ante
investigate the different avenues that could be pursued to wind down a bank,
should a problem occur. As part of this process, well designed burden sharing
agreement should contribute to reduce moral hazard already present in the sys-
tem. Some reflections on how to design burden sharing agreements are presented
in the next sections.
7.3.1. Possible Objectives
The first thing to recall is that a burden-sharing mechanism should be considered
as a tool – that is part of a wider framework – and not as an objective in itself. A
key element of setting up a burden-sharing mechanism is, therefore, the definition
of its own objective. Indeed, burden-sharing mechanisms could be used to achieve
different goals. Clarifying the objective pursued by such a mechanism is certainly
not easy, but is nevertheless essential as it influences its key features and intro-
duces more rationality into what has sometimes become an emotional debate.
Three categories of primary objective could be defined:
1. objectives carving out authorities’ incentives before the crisis: the burden-
sharing mechanism is used to give authorities an incentive to carry out their
crisis prevention duties correctly, through a cost allocation that would be
based exclusively on responsibilities;
2. objectives carving out authorities’ incentives during the crisis: the objective
of burden-sharing mechanisms in this case would be to seek a cost allocation
that would help align authorities’ incentives to act to resolve a crisis in a way
that minimises any potentially harmful economic impact at the lowest overall
collective cost (globally cost-minimising resolution policy);
3. other objectives aiming at reallocating costs on the basis of a set of arbitrary
criteria: the objective of these burden-sharing mechanisms would be to deter-
mine the final cost allocation on the basis of a set of predefined normative
factors, such as for instance fairness or solidarity.
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Up to now, the different attempts to set up burden-sharing mechanisms, such as
the 2008 EU Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or the Scandinavian coop-
eration agreement, have not entirely clarified the primary objective pursued. A
ranking between these objectives is necessary as the final cost allocation will be
different if, for instance, authorities seek primarily to align incentives during the
crisis or if they prefer to base the cost allocation in first instance on responsibili-
ties. In addition, some objectives may be mutually exclusive. As explained in sec-
tion 3.2, in certain cases, a cost allocation primarily based on responsibilities or
on other arbitrary criteria may misalign incentives to minimise the global cost.
This calls for the determination of the primary objective of the mechanism.
7.3.2. Choice of Objective: Theoretical Elements
In a game-theoretic setting, domestic authorities’ incentives are eventually deter-
mined by the cost of the crisis they expect to bear. Given the large uncertainty that
prevails in the management of a crisis, the assessment of expected costs is
extremely difficult so authorities do also take account of potential unexpected
costs.
When there is no burden-sharing, domestic authorities’ incentives to opt for the
globally cost-minimising crisis resolution policy may not be aligned. If the burden
is not shared, domestic authorities, which are responsible for the management of
a crisis, may act non-cooperatively to keep their own domestic cost down. For
instance, ring-fencing can be used by a country to minimise the domestic cost of
the crisis, even if this would imply higher total costs. The absence of a burden-
sharing mechanism may thus preclude the emergence of a cooperative solution
that could be more favourable to everyone.
On the other hand, when burden-sharing is possible, perfectly informed authori-
ties will have a natural incentive to opt for the least-cost solution. This is because
the least cost solution, by definition, is less costly than any other solution and thus
generates an economic surplus (in the form of lower costs). In theory, the alloca-
tion of this surplus among all the different countries could reconcile their incen-
tives to implement the least-cost solution.
In such a case, however, a cost allocation primarily based on responsibilities or
arbitrary criteria, bears the risk of misaligning the incentives for implementing the
globally cost-minimising crisis resolution policy. A simplified example, provided
for illustration purposes only, is presented in Appendix 1. If the burden-sharing
mechanism is used in the first instance to align authorities’ interests, responsibil-
ities could nevertheless be used as a secondary criterion to determine the final cost
allocation. Indeed, in theory, there are several cost allocations that align author-
ities’ interests, depending on how the surplus from the cooperation effort is
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shared out. Formal responsibilities could be used in the second instance to deter-
mine which of these allocations should be used.
Note, finally, that there is a direct link between the way decisions regarding crisis
resolution policy are made and the objective of the burden-sharing mechanism.
For example, the existence of a central authority in charge of applying the glo-
bally cost-minimising crisis resolution policy would automatically fulfil the objec-
tive described above. The cost allocation resulting from the burden-sharing mech-
anisms could, in this case, be designed so as to satisfy alternative objectives.
7.3.3. Choice of Objective: Feasibility
Aligning the incentives to adopt the least cost resolution has several advantages.
First, it is anchored in a practical consideration that could benefit everyone and
builds on the already agreed common principles for crisis management defined in
the 2008 MoU. It could therefore be acceptable for everyone. Second, it implies
that the cost allocation cannot be determined ex ante as it strongly depends on
the nature of the crisis.
The feasibility of this objective could nevertheless be questioned. Indeed, it should
be noted that, even with a burden-sharing mechanism, aligning the interests of
authorities may prove difficult in practice. First, because crises are highly uncer-
tain events and authorities may not have the capacity to fully assess the economic
consequences of the full set of actions they could take to manage a crisis, in par-
ticular when time is limited. The management of a crisis may to some extent
resemble more closely a trial and error process than a fully deterministic one.
Second, because even if they were able to do so, they could have a different assess-
ment of the situation3. Finally, authorities’ incentives could be influenced by con-
cerns that are not directly related to the cost of the crisis (including industrial
policy concerns or even political considerations).
Therefore, if the second objective is chosen, which from a collective point of view
may seem desirable, ways of addressing these issues should be explored. Better
structuring the crisis management process could help mitigate these problems,
reduce potential mistrust and would consequently facilitate crisis management.
Very pragmatic solutions could help achieve a better structure. For example, the
presence of a third-party authority, as suggested in section 5, may help authorities
to focus on economic costs rather than on other considerations.
3 The assessment is a continuous process that may necessitate continuous discussions, exchanges and adjustments
between authorities. In a period of high uncertainty, it cannot be guaranteed that authorities from two different
countries will share the same opinion throughout the process.
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7.3.4. Choice of Objective: Is There a Need to Align 
Incentives?
One of the assumptions that may seem to underlie the choice of the primary
objective is that the cooperative solution minimises the global cost of the crisis.
In fact, two cases should be distinguished:
– the non-cooperative solution is not the global least-cost solution: In this case,
the incentives of the authority which has the power to take final decisions
regarding crisis management are not aligned on the incentives of other coun-
tries. For instance, the authorities of the home country manage the crisis with-
out taking into account important externalities on other countries. The bur-
den-sharing can be used to reach a solution in which authorities do cooperate
to implement the globally cost-minimising resolution policy;
– the non-cooperative solution is the global least cost solution: In certain cases,
the non-cooperative solution may be less costly for each of the authorities and
their interests are perfectly aligned to implement this solution (home and host
countries agree on the solution). An agreement between all the authorities
(home and host) is actually not necessary for the non-cooperative solution to
be the least-cost solution. Indeed, the non-cooperative solution can be the
least-cost solution if the authorities responsible for crisis management take
the decisions that are globally optimal (this is the case when the home-coun-
try authority has the correct incentives to implement the globally least-cost
solution, for instance when the home country assumes the whole burden,
such as in many operations observed during the recent crisis). The interests
are such that the globally-minimising cost resolution policy is also the policy
that keeps the home country’s domestic costs to a minimum. In this case, it is
not necessary to align authorities’ interests.
Determining which case is most likely is very difficult as it depends on a number
of factors that are specific to each crisis situation. The first thing to establish is
which authority has the real power to take decisions to manage the crisis. In
general, even though the home authorities play a key role, several authorities
intervene in the management of a crisis affecting a cross-border bank. Some coun-
tries may have the power to block a decision taken by the home country, though
e.g. ring-fencing or information retention. The probability of the interests of all
authorities intervening in crisis management being aligned may be smaller when
the optimal decision is to wind down the troubled bank. When the home country
recapitalises the bank and assumes the full burden, host authorities are less likely
to complain.
Even though it is not possible to determine ex ante whether a burden-sharing
agreement will or will not be necessary to align authorities’ incentives, the bene-
fits of cooperation should be acknowledged from the beginning. Indeed,
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acknowledging that the non-cooperative solution is preferable would have an
important impact on how authorities behave in normal times. If they know that
they will not cooperate in crisis times, they will have an incentive to refuse coop-
eration in normal times as well, with important implications on the effective con-
trol of cross-border banks or the exchange of information.
Finally, it should also be recognised that, because it takes time and effort, coop-
eration in crisis times is still difficult in practice and therefore may be sub-opti-
mal. Authorities acting alone may, in some circumstances, be better able to man-
age a crisis more efficiently. Cooperation is costly. These costs may render the
cooperative solution more costly than another non-cooperative solution. Facili-
tating cooperation is thus essential.
7.4. ESCAPING THE BINARY CHOICE BETWEEN EX ANTE 
AND EX POST
The ex ante vs. ex post question is often presented as a binary choice that has
tended to polarise burden-sharing debates. However, a burden-sharing mecha-
nism is never entirely ex ante or ex post4. Yet, some of its features can be, and it
is therefore important to define what can be agreed upon ex ante and what can-
not, keeping in mind that the ex-post behaviour of authorities, their choices and
preference for certain solutions will be strongly influenced by their perception of
the cost they will have to bear. The different components of a burden-sharing
mechanisms could include:
– a commitment to share the cost of the crisis;
– a cooperation procedure in normal times (including a procedure for informa-
tion exchange and allocation of supervisory tasks);
– a cooperation procedure for crisis times (from the alert, to the actual crisis
management, this procedure could also include ways to mobilise funds);
– general non-binding principles on how to share the costs; and
– a mechanism to determine the final cost allocation.
It is interesting to note that the legislative framework, existing MoUs and other
cooperation agreements already contain most of these elements. In the 2008
MoU, authorities have indeed committed themselves to sharing the cost of the
crisis, “on the basis of balanced and equitable criteria, which take into account
the economic impact of the crisis in the countries affected and the framework of
home and host countries’ supervisory powers”5. The 2008 MoU establishes a
4 An example is some of the guarantees jointly granted by several member states (e.g. in the Dexia rescue). The
schemes were discussed at the height of the crisis (ex post) and had never been discussed in normal times.
However, no one knows what the final cost allocation will be and even if this is going to be expensive.
5 Note to that extent that the MoU has not made any choice between the objective to align interests in normal
times and the objective to align them during a crisis.
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procedure for cooperating in the event of a crisis. Previous MoUs as well as the
legislative framework, including the CRD, deal with cooperation in normal times.
The only element that is not yet foreseen in the current framework is the mecha-
nism that determines the final cost allocation. However, as argued above, it is not
desirable to define this mechanism ex ante, as a rigid and unsound ex-ante spec-
ification of the cost allocation can lead to inappropriate incentives.
Does that mean that nothing can be done? No. Authorities could focus on the
procedures for cooperation in normal times and cooperation in crisis times. Since
they have not been entirely satisfactory, one should further investigate pragmatic
steps to improve them and facilitate crisis resolution as well as burden-sharing
negotiations. Some examples of such steps are listed in section 5.
7.5. FACILITATING THE RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS AND 
THE ALLOCATION OF ITS COST
Improvements in cooperation procedures in normal times should focus on infor-
mation exchange. Improvements in cooperation procedures in crisis times should
address information exchange, assessment, fair implementation of crisis resolu-
tion plans, and time management. Indeed, at least three assumptions need to be
fulfilled before authorities can agree to share the cost of a crisis. First, they need
to be adequately informed regarding the nature of the crisis, its knock-on effects
for their own economy and for other economies, and be able to assess the impact
of each possible crisis resolution mechanism. Otherwise, they may find it difficult
to determine the optimal resolution mechanism or could disagree on it. Secondly,
they need to trust each other and to be able to monitor how other authorities are
managing the crisis. Third, they need to be able to manage time, which is of the
essence in crisis resolution. The ex-ante features of the burden-sharing mecha-
nisms should thus focus on these three axes.
Information: Authorities will be more reluctant to contribute to crisis resolution
if they are not kept adequately informed. Setting up colleges of supervisors con-
tributes to information exchanges. As they are closely involved in crisis manage-
ment, central banks and finance ministries should also benefit from information
exchange. The cross-border stability groups proposed in the 2008 MoU were
designed to contribute to the dissemination of information between authorities.
Getting these groups up and running may help but it is probably not a panacea if
domestic authorities’ reluctance to share information, for fear of potential leaks,
ring-fencing or inappropriate use of information, cannot be resolved. In addition,
information flows should be organised both in normal and in crisis times. The
difficulty of organising information flows in times of crisis may be even more
acute. Finally, although the authorities have agreed on a framework for systemic
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assessment, there is currently no mechanism ensuring that they can agree on the
least-cost solution. Authorities that do not agree on the solution to be imple-
mented are not likely to agree to share the cost of the crisis in the first place.
Trust: Authorities should trust each other, and be able to monitor how they
respectively manage the crisis. The presence of an authority not directly involved
in the case, that would take part in negotiations, could facilitate fair cooperation.
It is also justified by externalities arising from potential misbehaviour. This third
party, who could for instance be a representative from the EBA, the European
Commission, or the ESRB, could have a passive role as observer, or, if parties
agree and if need be, could be given a more active role either as facilitator or even
mediator. The presence of a third-party authority should help reduce the risk of
authorities acting in bad faith, or non-cooperatively.
Time: Crisis management is also a race against the clock. The ex-ante features can
therefore not be too prescriptive and should be flexible enough to leave the
authorities room for manoeuvre. To that extent, different ways of speeding up
crisis management in a cross-border context should be explored, concerning for
instance the common assessment or the decision-making process, the best way to
circulate information and mobilise funds to manage the crisis.
7.6. CONCLUSIONS
Improving the cross-border crisis resolution framework is going to be a long and
difficult process, requiring consistency and determination. Some elements of
improvement have been briefly sketched here. They relate to the need to
strengthen authorities’ toolkits, to implement a cross-border coordination frame-
work, as well as to reconcile authorities’ interests, through burden-sharing agree-
ments, for example.
How policy proposals in this regard will influence crisis management is certainly
difficult to determine, as many other factors could influence the final outcome.
However, their impact should be carefully reviewed. A practical proposal to eval-
uate the merits of any new proposal is to use case studies. Recent experience has
provided many interesting cases. In some of them, purely domestic banks were
affected by the crisis and it was resolved by the home authority. Other cases have
involved cross-border banks. Crises were then managed by the home country,
which sometimes assumed the full burden. In certain cases, the home-country
authorities managed the crisis in close cooperation with the host authorities and
ex-post burden-sharing mechanisms have even been successfully negotiated.
Reviewing how the proposed modifications would have changed the ultimate
outcome in each of these cases means delving into very practical issues, and illus-
trates how the burden-sharing mechanism would work and what its benefits
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could be. In that sense, it could help to gather further support for the proposal or
help identify potential weaknesses or perverse side effects that would need to be
resolved.
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APPENDIX 1. EXAMPLE: OBJECTIVE AND COST ALLOCATION
Imagine an ailing bank that is active in three countries, A (home), B (subsidiary)
and C (branch). The three countries have two options for managing the crisis. A
cooperative solution in which the total cost of the crisis amounts to 18, divided
as follows: A: 10, B: 8 and C: 0. If the various national authorities do not coop-
erate, the cost of the crisis amounts to 21, where the cost for countries A, B and
C is 11, 5 and 5 respectively. Under the cooperative solution, the cost is lower but
distributed differently, due to the fact that country A and B need to recapitalise
the bank up to an amount of 10 and 8 respectively (country C does not directly
participate as the bank entity active in country C is a branch). If countries do not
cooperate, the bank is liquidated, and each of the countries has to bear the cost
associated with the winding-up (for instance, cost for the deposit insurance,
impact on the financial sector, etc.). The cost of the non-cooperative solution is
higher in country A and C but lower in country B which is able to ring-fence some
of the assets in the subsidiary. In other words, interests are misaligned and coun-
tries A and C have an interest in co-operation, but not country B which can ring-
fence assets. In this example, interests are clearly misaligned. The case in which
interests are aligned is dealt with in sub-section 3.4.
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Three burden-sharing allocations could be envisaged when authorities cooperate.
In the first case, the cost of the crisis is divided according to responsibilities.
Country A, the home country, bears 2/3 of the costs and country B, which hosts
a subsidiary, one-third. Country C, in which the bank is incorporated as a branch,
does not contribute at all. In this case, both countries A and B will prefer the
fallback non-cooperative solution as it is less costly for them. The second alloca-
tion is designed to make sure that the least-cost solution is profitable for every-
one. One-third of the surplus (1 = 1/3 (21-18)) is allocated to each authority.
After the burden has been shared out, each country is better off under the coop-
erative solution. Finally, the third allocation distributes the cost of the crisis
according to an arbitrary criteria, as each country has to bear one-third of the
total cost. In this case, both countries B and C are better off under the non-coop-
erative solution. Consequently, the first and third allocation formulae do not give
authorities any incentive to adopt the global least-cost resolution policy.
Table 1. Costs According to Different Scenarios
If the burden-sharing mechanism is used in the first instance to align authorities’
interests, responsibilities could nevertheless be used as a secondary criterion to
determine the final cost allocation. Indeed, in theory, there are several cost allo-
cations that align authorities’ interests, depending on how the surplus from the
cooperation effort is shared out (in this case, one-third for each authority). For-
mal responsibilities could be used in second instance to determine which of these
allocations should be used (for instance, it could be A: 11; B: 5 and C: 2 if the
surplus from cooperation is given in full to country C).
  Country A Country B Country C Total Cost
Non-cooperative solution 11 5 5 21
Cooperative solution 10 8 0 18
Allocation 1: Responsibilities 12 6 0 18
Allocation 2: Least-Cost Solution 10 4 4 18
Allocation 3: Equal contribution 6 6 6 18
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8. LIMITS TO THE ‘LENDER OF LAST RESORT’, 
‘TOO BIG TO FAIL’ AND ‘TOO BIG TO SAVE’ 
THESES
Frank Lierman and Morten Balling
Charles Goodhart, Emeritus Professor, Financial Markets Group, London School
of Economics focussed in his presentation in Session 3 on the Limits of the Lender
of Last Resort concept. During the crisis, central banks have lent to a wide range
of borrowers and accepted a broad set of collateral and with increasing maturi-
ties. As a consequence, banks now know that they are going to get central bank
financing, if they need it. The development of large financial institutions has been
enhanced during the crisis. The relative importance of systemically important
banks has increased. It is a difficult exercise to distinguish between narrow banks
and broad banks. There are some differences between the views on market effi-
ciency and regulation in the US and in Europe. Many European authorities favour
more macro-prudential regulation while the views on regulation are more scepti-
cal in the US. Such differences and battles over responsibilities of home and host
country regulators make international agreements more difficult.
Philipp Hartmann, Vice President of SUERF and Head of the Financial Research
Division, European Central Bank, talked about the Lender of Last Resort, its
limits and what he called the ‘2X2 Fail Issues’. He pointed out that there are
different notions of the Lender of Last Resort concept. National central banks,
treasuries and international institutions can all potentially be called upon to pro-
vide support to financial institutions and systems in distress. Central banks can
provide emergency liquidity assistance to individual institutions, they can lend to
the general market and they can conduct traditional monetary and interest rate
policy. Their capacity to lend is theoretically almost unlimited but concerns about
credit risk, the potential implications of fiscal guarantees for central bank inde-
pendence, reluctance to have central banks replacing the private money markets
mean that there are limits to such operations.
During the crisis, many governments have given support through guarantees,
injection of equity capital and by taking over impaired assets. There are, however,
also limits to such fiscal Lender of Last Resort operations. Some bank rescue
packages imply direct government ownership of banks, and this is in most juris-
dictions considered to be undesirable as a permanent arrangement. Theoretically,
the capacity for treasury bailouts of banks in difficulties is very large, but con-
cerns about the potential burden on future generations, moral hazard and level
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playing field considerations constrain such rescue operations. In small countries
with large banking operations, there might also be a fear of a possible sovereign
crisis if fiscal support goes too far. At the international level, the IMF has
expanded its facilities and encouraged the establishment of new central bank
swap-lines.
In a slide, Mr. Hartmann provided an overview of national stabilization programs
with ceilings for respectively capital injections, guarantees, asset purchases and
swaps. The sum of the ceilings divided by the country’s GDP was used as a rough
measure of the relative importance of the stabilization programs. Amounts actu-
ally paid out were significantly lower by the time of the conference, averaging
around 10% of GDP with significant differences across countries. 
The ‘Xs’ referred to in the headline of the presentation were respectively size,
complexity and interconnectedness. The ‘Xs’ are related but not identical. Mr.
Hartmann gave an overview of different innovative ideas from various authors
who had suggested solutions to the 2X2 fail issues. The list included arrange-
ments where capital and/or liquidity requirements were dependent on ‘X’, private
capital insurance, access to pool of funds against a Pigou or Tobin tax, compul-
sory contingent capital, compulsory equity issuance in response to CDS spreads,
living wills, a strengthened competition policy in banking and breaking up of
large banks. The Financial Stability Board works on proposals how to reduce
risks posed by systemically important institutions. They can be classified under
three headlines: prudential measures, failure resolution and resilience of infra-
structures to failures.
Dirk Schoenmaker, Dean, Duisenberg School of Finance, posed the question: Is it
a good idea to break up big banks and create several small banks instead? The
answer is no. The crisis has hit both countries with large banks and countries with
small banks. If a big bank is broken up, there will be a loss of economies of scale
and scope and loss of credit risk diversification. In a table the speaker showed for
a sample of big banks in 14 countries the ratio between the value of their equity
capital and the GDP of the country in which the headquarters is located. The
ratios could give an impression of the potential costs of bail-out. If the ratio is
over 4%, the country is classified as a country with large bail-out costs. United
Kingdom and the Netherlands belong to this group. Relevant policy options for
countries with large banks are: Stronger independence and accountability of
supervisors, prompt and corrective action when problems arise, burden sharing
with other countries and an end to the too-big-to-fail doctrine.
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9. DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES: 
HOW TO RE-ESTABLISH CLIENTS’ CONFIDENCE
Rym Ayadi, Frank Lierman and Morten Balling
In Session 4, the first presentation was given by Hans Groeneveld, Senior Advisor
to the Executive Board, Rabobank Nederland. The speaker started by describing
the recent runs on Northern Rock in the UK and DSB Bank in the Netherlands.
During the financial crisis, guarantees for deposits had been expanded in most
countries. The main objective was to safeguard the confidence of small savers in
the stability of the financial system and to protect them from incurring large
losses due to bank failures. Retail depositors are unable to monitor and assess the
riskiness of the institutions that are holding their deposits. A deposit guarantee
scheme should – according to the speaker – not be considered as a crisis instru-
ment but as a financial safety net for incidental, small bank insolvencies. It should
be clear and transparent for the public and contain the right incentives for depos-
itors and banks to discourage moral hazard and abuse. Feasible policy options are
regulatory limitations on banks with risky or one-sided business models, capping
of the funding contribution by individual participants in the scheme and risk
weighted contributions with significant differences.
Maria J. Nieto, Advisor to the Director General of Banking Regulation, Banco de
España, described deposit insurance as the neglected dimension of the EU safety
net. Because bank failures have imposed large losses on tax payers, an objective
for prudential supervisors could be to minimize the cost of bank failures. Accord-
ing to EU rules, the objectives are to ensure compliance with relevant laws and
regulations, to promote financial stability, to promote confidence and encourage
efficiency in the banking system and to protect consumers and depositors. These
objectives can be pursued in ways that do not significantly raise expected losses
of banking crises. EU rules call for prudential measures to be applied promptly.
The principle of early intervention is thus established but it does not significantly
reduce supervisory discretion as to when to intervene or establish minimum
supervisory actions. The speaker concluded by saying that EU policy makers have
largely neglected the interrelation between deposit insurance and prudential
supervision and reorganization and winding up procedures.
Dirk Cupei, Director, Association of German Banks, and Vice Chairman, Euro-
pean Forum of Deposit Insurers, started with some remarks about the EFDI.
Then he gave a survey of what has already been done during the financial crisis.
Coverage levels had been increased temporarily, several National schemes had
been amended, the level of protection had been increased to EUR 100,000 by 14
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of the 27 EU member states, and the Basel Committee had published new core
principles on deposit insurance. The speaker next discussed how deposit guaran-
tee schemes can contribute further to re-establishing depositors’ confidence.
Among the possible steps he mentioned speed, in particular a shorter timeframe
for compensation, adequate financing, refinancing facilities, level and scope of
coverage (protected deposits and depositors) and abolition of co-insurance. The
EU Commission is currently working with proposals containing several of these
steps and with proposals concerning cross-border harmonization and standardi-
zation of the scope of protection and of the information to depositors. A long-
term perspective is a Pan-European deposit guarantee scheme but before such a
scheme can be implemented it is essential to strengthen cross-border cooperation
between the National authorities.
Robert Priester, Head of Department for Banking Supervision, Financial Mar-
kets, Global Banking Issues, International Affairs, European Banking Federation,
started by saying that it is the task of EBF to ensure that the voice of the banks is
heard when reforms of the financial safety net are discussed. To maintain a level
playing field environment is an important objective. Deposit guarantee schemes
should act against contagion, enhance consumers’ awareness and ensure an equal
level of depositor protection across Europe. Crisis prevention, crisis management
and crisis resolution are now on the reform agenda. Things need to change and
supervisors need to act together.
Doris Kolassa, DG ECFIN, European Commission, said that deposit guarantee
schemes are part of a broader picture. Capital adequacy requirements, strength-
ened supervision, consumer protection and resolution of financial institutions in
distress all contribute to a sound financial system. We should not deal with these
issues in isolation. The new EU Commission will decide how to proceed. In an EU
with 27 member states with very different deposit guarantee schemes, the Com-
mission will probably continue to be a strong voice for more harmonization. To
aim for one scheme for the whole of EU implies a considerable level of solidarity
regarding burden sharing. The design of future deposit guarantee schemes will
probably be linked to a new investor compensation directive.
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10. PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING DEPOSIT 
GUARANTEE SCHEMES IN EUROPE
Rym Ayadi and Rosa Lastra1
The global financial crisis has woken up the European authorities, prompting
them to review the existing frameworks to manage the crisis both domestically
and on a cross-border basis. In view of the series of events in the autumn of 2008,
the established public safety net arrangements, designed to create safeguards for
depositors, investors and policyholders, failed to ensure market confidence in the
midst of a long-lasting systemic crisis. This paper explores the limitations of
deposit guarantee schemes in the context of the overall safety net arrangements
in Europe and proposes concrete avenues for reforms.
Initiated in the US in the summer of 2007, the financial crisis worsened and
became global in 2008. The collapse of Lehman Brothers, the rescue of AIG and
the bail out of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 2008 were seismic
events in financial history. The crisis of Fortis, Dexia and the crisis in Iceland, to
cite a few relevant European developments, evidenced the international nature of
the crisis, which has been rightly characterized as the most severe one since the
Great Depression. The period of September/October 2008 will be remembered as
the time in which the financial system was reshaped and when previous assump-
tions about the nature of markets and the benefits of government intervention
were questioned again, given the unprecedented scale of the actions undertaken
by the authorities to combat the crisis. Many national responses ranging from
liquidity assistance to deposit guarantee schemes’ activation and other state aid
measures (guarantees, recapitalization plans and others) were poorly coordi-
nated, showing the limits of the current arrangements for European supervision
and crisis management.
After the run on Northern Rock in September 2007 (see picture 1) and the likely
spread of such a threat (a looming banking crisis) to other EU member states, the
Irish government, acting alone, was leading2 the scene by guaranteeing 100% of
the deposits of the six major Irish banks and increasing statutory limit for the
scheme for banks and building societies from € 20,000 to € 100,000 per depos-
itor per institution. This triggered a series of similar actions by other govern-
ments. The UK authorities increased deposit insurance coverage to £ 50,000
1 The authors wish to thank Ole Bus Henriksen, Gillian Garcia, Daniel Gros, Karel Lannoo and Maria Nieto for
their valuable comments on previous drafts.
2 Action announced on 30 September 2008 and passed in legislation by the Irish Parliament on October 2, 2008.
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(from £ 35,000). Other European governments followed suit (in Greece, Spain,
Germany…) (See graph 1).
The protection of private savings generated a debate in the EU about the effec-
tiveness and, the appropriate design of deposit insurance (See Table 1). Triggered
by these individual member states’ actions, European finance ministers decided
during a meeting in October 7, 2008 to increase Europe-wide deposit insurance,
for an initial period, of at least one year to a minimum of 50,000 euro, which
could be raised to 100,000 euro to contain the competitive distortions that such
actions could generate in the future.
However, these actions did not succeed to calm the disquiet of the market nor
in some cases halted the depositors from queuing in front of their banks.
Indeed, governments needed to resort to many other measures, including mas-
sive injections of liquidity, fiscal stimulus, and quantitative easing to restore
confidence.
It is in this context of safeguarding and restoring confidence where our analysis
comes into place. Notwithstanding the importance of other components of the
safety net ranging from lender of last resort (LOLR), emergency liquidity assist-
ance, bank insolvency proceedings to early intervention measures (such as the
new Special Resolution Regime introduced in the UK by the Banking Act
2009)3, this paper focuses on explicit deposit protection, which is one key ele-
ment that – if properly designed – and supported by effective bank supervision
greatly contribute to maintaining or restoring the confidence of individual
depositors in banks and the confidence of the general public in the banking
system at large.
10.1. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON DGS IN A 
BROADER CONTEXT OF SAFETY NET 
ARRANGEMENTS4
Since the banking industry is inherently unstable, the authorities always need to
be prepared to confront the possibility of crises or problems. Over the years, a
number of preventive and remedial instruments have been devised to strengthen
the banking system and to defend it against any negative contingencies. Ex ante
measures comprise better banking regulation and supervision, transparency and
disclosure. Ex post mechanisms, designed to “steer the boat through a rowing
3 The [UK] Banking Bill was introduced into Parliament on 7 October 2008 and received Royal Assent on
12 February 2009. The Bill is now an Act of Parliament, the Banking Act 2009, available at www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/acts2009/ukpga_20090001_en_1.
4 This section of the paper draws upon Chapter 4 of Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary
Stability (Oxford University Press, 2006).
SUERF2010.book  Page 92  Monday, March 22, 2010  3:04 PMPROPOSALS FOR REFORMING DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES IN EUROPE 93
larcier
sea5”, include the suspension of convertibility of deposits into cash, the lender of
last resort role of the central bank, deposit insurance schemes, bank insolvency
proceedings and government policies of implicit protection of depositors (both
insured or uninsured) or banks (the ‘too-big-to-fail doctrine’ and the multiple
variants of this doctrine during the crisis: too interconnected to fail, too many to
fail, too big to save, etc.).
Deposit insurance has been the subject of much debate in the literature. In 1959
Milton Friedman expressed a widely held view when he asserted that the intro-
duction of US federal deposit insurance after the bank crisis of 1929-33, as part
of the New Deal legislation under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was “the most
important structural change in our monetary system in the direction of greater
stability since the post-Civil War tax on state bank notes”6.
Though deposit insurance has been adopted by law in many jurisdictions around
the World, particularly in the last two decades, its very existence has been much
debated in the literature7, though those that opposed deposit insurance in the past
may have changed their views on this subject in the light of the crisis.
10.2. STRUCTURE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
The structure of deposit guarantee schemes varies greatly from country to coun-
try, with differences with regard to their funding, coverage and administration8.
In this paper we do not analyze the specific policy and structural features of
deposit insurance, but rather some of the issues that are most relevant from the
point of institutional design. The first issue is the difference between explicit and
implicit deposit insurance, the second issue is the status of ‘preferred creditors’
that insured depositors have under an explicit deposit guarantee scheme. The
third issue is the mandatory nature of deposit insurance, as opposed to the con-
tingent nature of the lender of last resort role of the central bank.
5 The use of this ‘transportation analogy’ is borrowed from Joseph Stiglitz, who wrote an article on “Boats,
planes and capital flows” published by the Financial Times 25 March 1998. In that article he eloquently stated:
“Although one cannot predict when it [a crisis] might happen, the chances of their [the boats] being broadsided
by a wave are significant, no matter how well they are steered. Bad steering, though, increases the chances of
disaster and a leaky boat makes it inevitable”.
6 M. FRIEDMAN, The Control of Money. A Program for Monetary Stability, New York, Fordham University Press,
1959, 21.
7 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache conducted a study of banking crises around the world, covering
the period 1980-94 and concluded that “the presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme tends to increase
the probability of systemic banking problems”. See A. DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT and E. DETRAGIACHE, The Determi-
nants of Bank Crisis in Developing and Developed Countries, 45(1) IMF Staff Papers, 104, 1998. In a more
recent publication, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Edward Kane have come to a similar conclusion: “[c]ross-country
empirical research on deposit insurance strongly supports the hypothesis that in institutionally weak environ-
ments, poorly designed deposit-insurance arrangements tend to increase the probability of future banking
crises”. See A. DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT and E. KANE, Deposit Insurance Around the Globe, Where Does it Work?,
Washington DC: World Bank, World Bank Paper No. 2679, 2001, 24.
8 For a study of these issues, see inter alia, R. DALE, “Deposit Insurance in Theory and Practice” 8(1) Journal of
Financial Regulation and Compliance 36, 2000; G. GARCIA, Deposit Insurance: A Survey of Actual and Best
Practices, Washington DC, IMF Occasional Paper No. 197, 2001.
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10.3. EXPLICIT VERSUS IMPLICIT DEPOSIT INSURANCE
Explicit deposit insurance is the formal creation of a deposit guarantee scheme by
law, with specific rules concerning the extent of the ‘insurance’ or protection, the
operation of the scheme and the type of deposits/depositors protected. Explicit
deposit insurance can be useful as an instrument of protective bank regulation.
Explicit deposit insurance has traditionally served two purposes: consumer pro-
tection and the prevention of bank runs, as well as the broader objective of con-
tributing to financial stability. The rationale behind depositor protection is the
presumed inability of ordinary depositors to monitor the riskiness of banks in
which they place their funds as well as the potentially severe cost of deposit losses
to individual savers provide. The rationale behind the prevention of bank runs is
the inherent fragility of the banking system. Because of the first-come, first serve
nature of bank liabilities, and because loans (unless securitized) are highly
illiquid, and worth less at liquidation than on a going concern basis, depositors
have a rational propensity ‘to run’ at the first sign of trouble. Bank failures
become highly contagious, thereby exposing the financial system to the risk of
depositor panics. We argue that a third rationale of explicit deposit insurance (in
addition to consumer protection and prevention of bank runs) is that it allows the
public authorities to close banks more easily, as it becomes politically acceptable
to liquidate insolvent institutions, in the knowledge that unsophisticated deposi-
tors are protected.
Under an explicit deposit guarantee scheme, depositors are only paid once the
bank is closed. Thus, there can be no deposit insurance if the bank remains open.
Therefore, explicit deposit insurance presupposes that a bank has failed and,
hence, it is not compatible with the ‘too big to fail’-doctrine.
The European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee9 took the view in 1999
that explicit deposit insurance can and should play a key role primarily in facili-
tating the liquidation of insolvent banks without the need for implicit deposit
protection. The ESFRC argued that the practice of bailing out insolvent institu-
tions (implicit protection) creates expectations of official support beyond deposit
insurance limits, thereby distorting market incentives and undermining financial
discipline (the so-called moral hazard problem). It is the strongly held view of the
ESFRC that deposit insurance should be designed and operated in a way that
allows, and indeed requires, national authorities to liquidate insolvent banks,
thereby exposing uninsured depositors and other creditors to default risk. Such
an approach ensures that high-risk institutions pay a market penalty in terms of
higher funding costs. In this way excessive risk-taking can be discouraged.
9 See ESFRC Statement No. 5 of 18 October 1999. The statements of the ESFRC are available at www.ceps.be
and www.aei.org.
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Implicit deposit insurance, as opposed to explicit deposit insurance, is a ‘blanket
guarantee’ for all sorts of depositors (insured and uninsured), other creditors,
shareholders and even managers. Implicit deposit insurance often presupposes
that the bank remains in business (either because it is ‘too big to fail’ or because
it is politically difficult to close the bank) thus creating pervasive moral hazard
incentives. While explicit deposit insurance is applied ex post (following the clo-
sure of a bank), implicit deposit insurance is often applied while a bank is still in
operation.
Explicit deposit insurance inflicts only very limited damage upon taxpayers, and,
depending on the funding of the scheme, there may no damage at all. However,
implicit deposit insurance has the potential of shifting the burden onto taxpayers,
since rescue packages tend to be financed by the government. The use of rescue
packages results not only in moral hazard considerations but may also affect
competition, especially if a too big to fail doctrine is applied.
10.4. ‘PREFERRED CREDITORS’
Explicit deposit insurance is a guarantee limited to one type of ‘preferred credi-
tors’, i.e. insured depositors. Under explicit deposit insurance uninsured deposi-
tors, other creditors, shareholders and managers are not protected. Therefore,
explicit deposit insurance is more compatible with market discipline, as unin-
sured depositors and other creditors have an interest in monitoring the solvency
of the bank while still in operation. Explicit deposit insurance can co-exist with
insolvency laws that give preference to depositors and also with insolvency laws
that do not establish such preference in their bankruptcy procedures. (As
acknowledged, in some jurisdictions, insolvency laws have a system of depositor
preference, while in other jurisdictions, depositors’ claims run pari passu with
other creditors’ claims).
Explicit deposit insurance, by limiting the protection of ‘insured depositors’
exposes uninsured depositors, general creditors, subordinated debt-holders,
shareholders and management to increased risk exposure, thereby encouraging
them to monitor and limit the riskiness of the bank. These incentives are very
important, particularly in the case of shareholders, whose limited liability renders
them more prone to lend on a high risk/high return basis, while restricting their
own exposure through high leverage10. In the absence of open bank assistance,
management will also be inclined to run the institution in a prudent manner, or
risk being removed from office.
10 See generally R. S. DALE, “Deposit Insurance, Policy Clash over EC and US Reforms” in F. C. SHADRACK and
L. KOROBOW (eds.), The Basic Elements of Bank Supervision, New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
1993.
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In its statement of October 1999, the ESFRC recommended that uninsured
deposits and other liabilities should be ‘credibly uninsured’, meaning that holders
of such claims have no expectation of official support in the event of a bank
insolvency. Explicit deposit insurance must be set at a level that enables national
authorities to accept the political consequences of bank liquidations.
10.5. MANDATORY VERSUS CONTINGENT GUARANTEE
Deposit insurance provides a guarantee on certain deposits that is non-contin-
gent. It provides legal certainty as to the way the depositors will be protected and
the amount covered, should a bank be closed. Lender of last resort, on the other
hand, is contingent. The injection of liquidity in times of crises is not mandatory,
but discretionary, ie, subject to the discretion of the central bank authority. There
is always a degree of uncertainty regarding the provision of emergency liquidity
assistance by the central bank.
To minimise the risk of moral hazard, it is important to demarcate what each
institutional arrangement can do and what it cannot do or should not do. Explicit
deposit insurance can protect insured depositors, but it cannot – nor should –
protect other depositors or creditors, nor shareholders, nor managers. Explicit
deposit insurance cannot protect the banks, because it can only be activated once
a bank is closed.
In our opinion, deposit guarantee schemes should be mandatory and explicit in
nature, credible and limited in the amount covered11.
10.6. DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES IN EUROPE
In Europe, the 1994 Directive (94/19/EC) provided a minimum harmonization
background for establishing deposit guarantee schemes. It resulted in a decentral-
ized approach to deposit insurance. While the criteria used in the Directive were
generally harmonized in terms of the scope (the exclusion of the interbank and
corporate deposits) and the minimum of coverage (fixed at 20,000 euro per per-
son per bank), they were not sufficient to ensure a sound European deposit guar-
antee system. Indeed, the directive was implemented unevenly in the member
states as a result of divergent interpretations of its provisions. Table 1 shows dif-
ferences between selected member states in the legal framework, in the adminis-
tration of the schemes, the extent of coverage, the co-insurance practices and the
sources of funding. In light of continuing trends of cross-border banking these
divergences in implementation address major challenges. While foreign branches
11 See also www.efdi.net/scarica.asp?id=65&Types=DOCUMENTS.
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of EU banks are covered by the home deposit guarantee scheme, foreign subsidi-
aries of EU banks are covered by host deposit guarantee scheme. Both schemes
can be intrinsically different and depositors are not necessarily aware of such
differences and in the majority of the cases are not protected evenly. The situation
gets further complicated in the case of branches of non-EU banks and in countries
where no deposit guarantee schemes exists12.
Not only does this raise competitive considerations and can it be the source of
potential conflicts of interest between the host and the home countries’ authori-
ties; but also does it add further confusion and complications for depositors, par-
ticularly if a bank failure occurs.
These limitations were acknowledged by the European Commission in a commu-
nication13 in November 2006, less than a year before the eruption of the crisis.
The conclusions concurred not to make changes to the directive, but to work on
some interpretative guidance and recommendations on the main aspects of the
directive14.
The financial crisis has not only put into doubt the adequacy of the existing
national schemes and the European Commission’s decision not to amend the
directive earlier, but has also pressed governments in the member states of the EU
and EEA to take individual un-concerted actions to help restoring confidence in
their domestic markets. These individual actions have then prompted EU policy
makers to revise the original directive to prevent competitive distortions. Amend-
ments were introduced to reassure depositors rather than to promote the conver-
gence of deposit guarantee schemes. These amendments revised three key areas:
a) the increase of the coverage level (from a minimum of € 20,000  to  first
€ 50,000 and within a further year to at least € 100,00015), b) the reduction of
the payout delay to a maximum of 3 days16 and c) the termination of co-insur-
ance.
In its design, the 1994 Directive fails to tackle some key aspects. It leaves to the
discretion of the member states a number of issues that are not harmonized, such
12 The work of the Basel Committee and the International Association of Deposit Insurers, in particular the Core
principles for effective deposit insurance systems, published on 12 March 2009 is the most relevant example of
international harmonization (albeit of a soft law nature) in this area. See www.bis.org/publ/bcbs151.htm.
13 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/comm9419_en.pdf.
14 The definition of deposits and scope of coverage, the coinsurance, the topping up arrangements, the exchange
of information requirements, the risk based contributions to DGS, the transferability/refundability of SGD
contributions, the consumer information and advertising,…
15 In the compromise package of the Council published on 24 November 2008 and which was agreed on the
2 December 2008, changes to the original Commission’s proposal related to coverage levels were introduced.
The timeline of increasing the coverage to € 100,000 was extended by two years (from 31 December 2009 to
31 December 2011), subject to a report by the European Commission to evaluate the impact of such an increase
and the necessity for this amount to become a harmonised coverage level in the Community. The new coverage
level becomes a maximum, rather than a minimum as in the 1994 Directive.
16 The 3 day payout delay was deemed unrealistic by the European Parliament and the Council. The former
proposed an extension of the payout delay to 10 days and the former to 20 days. The Council also expects from
the European Commission an impact assessment on the delays of the payout procedures by 31 December 2010.
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the funding of the schemes, their risk sensitivity and the consideration of home
and host country conflicts, which have been manifested in the cases of Ireland and
Iceland (though for different reasons and with different considerations as we fur-
ther discuss below). Though the line between what should be harmonized and
what should be left to the discretion of national authorities is a fluid and dynamic
one, the experience of the current crisis suggests that a greater degree of harmo-
nization and, possibly, the introduction of a Community arrangement17 is needed
with regard to deposit guarantee schemes, given that with the freedom to move
capital and to provide financial services and products across the EU (which cor-
responds to the Single Market philosophy), regulatory measures in one country
(e.g. the guarantee of private savings in the six largest Irish banks by the Irish
government) have competitive implications in other jurisdictions.
The crisis also raises important issues about the ability of some governments to
underwrite their deposit guarantee schemes and to fulfill their obligations under
the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (as in the case of Iceland). The ‘natural’
tendency of countries to protect their own nationals in a crisis needs to be recon-
ciled with the obligations of EU membership or participation in the European
Economic Area.
The responsibility of the home country supervisor for branches – in particular
with regard to the obligations of the DGS – has been put under the spotlight
following the collapse of the Icelandic banks, where the Icelandic authorities were
not in a position to fulfill such obligations. Notwithstanding the subsequent han-
dling by the UK authorities, the truth of the matter remains that reliance upon
home country control proved very problematic, thus leading some commentators
to push for host country control, perhaps by making branches of countries whose
financial soundness is in doubt, be converted into subsidiaries. This is, of course,
a departure from one of the principles of the single market, the home country
control and single passport, which has been rather successful till relatively recent.
If a retrenchment of the single market is to be avoided, perhaps we need a move
to a pan-European supervisory arrangement (thought that would mean the need
to tackle the fiscal issue), as Howard Davies proposed in a contribution to the
Financial Times (Europe’s Banks need a Federal Fix, FT 14 January 2009).
The collapse of the Icelandic Landsbanki in October 2008, along with several
other difficulties affecting the country’s banking institutions and the alleged
unwillingness or inability of the Icelandic Government to accept responsibility to
save UK deposits has soured relationships between the UK and Iceland, with the
17 In a CEPS report Karel Lannoo (2008) supports the creation of a federal deposit protection fund in the EU
rather than attempting to harmonize different national deposit protection schemes (in K. LANNOO (2008),
“Concrete steps towards more integrated financial oversight”, CEPS Taskforce report). In a more recent CEPS
Taskforce report on bank crisis resolution, Carmassi et al., 2010, defend an ex ante funded European deposit
insurance fund in “overcoming too big to fail”. Ex ante funding has been considered by the European Commis-
sion too, as well as other issues such as the links with supervision, and with resolution procedures.
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Treasury threatening legal proceedings to enforce compliance with the EU’s
Directive on deposit guarantee schemes. The UK Treasury also took the extreme
step of invoking the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act as a legal basis to
block Landsbanki assets in the United Kingdom, effectively as a means of secur-
ing assets for the benefit of depositors. As is invariably the case, blocking orders
of this kind impose a significant burden of compliance on financial institutions18.
The 2008 amendments of the directive 94/19/EC provide useful lessons for a fun-
damental review of the adequacy of the existing schemes and for the discussion
of possible improvements to enhance the level playing field in Europe.
First, the coverage limit that had been fixed by the directive to a minimum of
€ 20,000 was not effective in preventing bank runs and re-establishing the gen-
eral public confidence. The differences in coverage and scope in an internal mar-
ket leads to competitive distortions and market confusion. The amount covered
must be credible and harmonized. A credible deposit insurance system requires
inter alia prompt payment of depositors (next business day as in the US is consid-
ered ideal by many) and a reasonable amount of coverage (neither too meagre to
be non-credible nor too generous to incur into moral hazard incentives)19. A har-
monised coverage will avoid competitive distortions and other burdens related to
topping up and information exchange between schemes.
Second, at a national level when more than one competent authority is entrusted
with responsibilities in a bank failure situation, it is important to establish a
mechanism to set the scope and the hierarchy of various powers ex-ante in order
to insure the timely payouts of depositors. The failure of such arrangement pro-
voked a bank run on Northern Rock in the UK. A hypothetical bank run on a
cross-border institution in Europe would raise several questions on such arrange-
ments between the different deposit insurers of the host and home countries. The
new banking legislation in the UK has introduced early intervention mechanisms
in the pre-insolvency phase, with new powers vested upon the Bank of England
in the exercise of that Special Resolution Regime (SRR), which comprises three
stabilization options; transfer to a private sector purchaser, bridge bank and tem-
porary public ownership. Though there was some debate in the consultation that
led to the Banking Act as to who the competent authority for running the SRR
should be, in the end it was decided that the Bank of England (which also receives
a statutory mandate with regard to financial stability) should be such authority,
though the FSA remains in charge of bank supervision and will be the institution
that will pull the trigger to assess when an institution should be subject to SRR.
18 See Ch. PROCTOR, mimeo 2008.
19 See LASTRA, “Northern Rock, UK Bank Insolvency and Cross-Border Bank Insolvency”, published in the
Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 939-955, May 2008.
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Third, the topping up arrangements20 must be revisited in line with further har-
monization of deposit guarantee schemes. The branches that opted for a topping
up solution are insured by two deposits insurers (home and host) and pay premi-
ums for both. The 2008 amendment of the 94/19/EC directive explicitly requires
schemes to cooperate with each other to avoid complications related to delays of
payments, breakdown between what should be paid under which scheme and
exchange of information between schemes. Notwithstanding such an improve-
ment, depositors may not be necessarily informed about such arrangements,
which may create further disarray in a situation of crisis. In addition, such
arrangements only deals with the provision of services via branches, and do not
consider direct provision of financial services.
Fourth, the scheme needs to be widely known by depositors. Ample publicity
should be given to the scheme in order to make it credible; depositors should be in
no doubt that their deposits will be covered, up to the amount specified in the law.
Fifth, risk based contributions must be the way forward to ensure fairness
between banking institutions with different risk profiles. High risk institutions
are expected to pay higher contributions and vice versa. Stressing on risk based
schemes will add further incentives to banks to improve risk management, which
is a natural development in view of the risk sensitive elements introduced by the
capital requirement directive.
Sixth, for large cross border banks, considerable resources are required if a DGS
were to play a meaningful role in any crisis management. The combination of
today’s collection of DGS may prove to be inadequate; therefore, proposals are
needed to ensure an adequate funding. Preference should be given to private pre-
funding mechanisms, but is this is not sufficient, and then state topping-up could
be envisaged.
10.7. MOVING TO A PAN-EUROPEAN DEPOSIT GUARANTEE 
SYSTEM
We suggest that a single market in financial services requires a European solution
with regard to deposit insurance. The possible establishment of a European
deposit guarantee system could address the problems for large cross border banks
with major cross border exposures through branches or subsidiaries21. Such a
20 When a bank sets up a branch in another EU member state where the coverage level is higher of the scope is
broader than in its home country, then it has the right to join the host country deposit guarantee scheme. This
avoids any competitive distortions at a local market level.
21 In this paper we do not discuss the relative benefits for European banks and for their supervisors of setting
branches or subsidiaries in terms of their cross-border establishments. A trend towards subsidiarisation needs
to be carefully assessed, to make sure it does not imply a departure from the tenets of the single market in
financial services.
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scheme would in principle be a more efficient solution than the current frag-
mented framework of almost 40 DGS in the 27 Member states. It would also help
remove competitive distortions, deal with administrative burdens, avoid branch/
subsidiaries’ consumers confusion and most importantly preserve the internal
market for retail banking. The financial crisis episodes of bank runs and tax pay-
ers’ money spending to save major reputable banks were vivid illustrations of the
interconnectivity of banks, the scale of their operations in their local and regional
economies and most importantly the speed of the contagion. The fundamental
question is how to prevent the internal market for financial services from disinte-
gration and at the same time protect EU depositors and savers. The establishment
of the European supervisory authorities (for Banking, Securities and Insurance)
and the European Systemic Risk Board22 are steps into the direction of finding
European solutions for European financial institutions. The next step is thus to
complete the supervisory and crisis management architecture with a European
safety net system. Home country safety net per se is not a sufficient option any
longer. This reinforces the case for a European deposit protection solution, which
appears to many as a logical development in today’s financial market23.
There are in principle three alternatives for such a construction to happen:
1. an optional DGS that is complimentary to the 27 existing DGS – ‘a 28
regime’;
2. a single European DGS that replaces the existing 27 DGSs;
3. a European system of DGS – a sort of college of DGS providing each other
mutual assistance.
For each alternative, the scope of coverage/protection (in our opinion, only
insured deposits), the coverage level, the financing mechanisms, the pay out
delays and modalities and the interactions with the other mechanisms of the
safety net need to be thoroughly examined.
The diversity of Europe’s banking market should also be taken into considera-
tion. Large cross-border, regional and local banks coexist, while serving different
22 The Ecofin Council on 2 December 2009 approved the creation of the new three European Supervisory Author-
ities, which together with the European System Risk Board (for which broad political agreement was reached
on 20 October 2009) form the new EU supervisory structure. See www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/
docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/111706.pdf.
See www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/106/106i.pdf.
23 Recent proposals are sympathetic with a European deposit insurance system. Carmassi et al., 2010, envisage
the establishment of a European deposit insurance system through the creation of a prefunded, risk based
European deposit insurance fund that serves to protect depositors of large European banks in case of crisis
situation or failure; and the European deposit insurance corporation which will be entrusted of any power to
recapitalize or bail out failing institutions and reorganization functions aimed at depositors protection. Another
proposal from the European Parliament supports the establishment of a European financial protection fund that
will replace the membership in the existing national deposit guarantee schemes for institutions participating in
it. Financed by financial institutions, debt issuance and under exceptional circumstances subject to member
states guarantees, it will serve to ensure financial stability. This fund will be managed by a board appointed by
the European Banking Authority for a period of 5 years. Deutsche Bank CEO Josef Ackermann advocated in
Davos in January 2010 the establishment of a European Rescue and Resolution Fund largely financed by the
banking industry.
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segments of the market. A European deposit insurance scheme covering cross
border banks and national schemes covering all other domestic banks can coexist
if they are harmonized in terms of their operations, coverage and financing mech-
anisms and interaction with the other mechanism of safety net.
Deposit insurance, if properly designed and administrated, makes it politically
feasible and practically possible to close a bank because the authorities know that
depositors are protected, as we pointed above.
We argue that the establishment of a European system of DGS (or a network of
DGS) would better fit with the needs of the single market in financial services
than the current decentralized structure.
10.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There is strong evidence that some ‘conventional tools’ failed to act as ‘lines of
defense’ in the crisis and that other tools and institutional arrangements ought to
be considered (from non conventional monetary policies to new arrangements for
cross border resolution). This is the context of the arguments underlying this
paper. Greater reliance on EU arrangements appears as the logical solution to the
inconsistencies of the operation of the single market in financial services, in par-
ticular in the euro-zone. The difficulties of solving these inconsistencies are fur-
ther compounded by the domain of fiscal policy in the EU.
Going forward we need better regulation, better supervision and better crisis
management (including credible explicit deposit insurance) on a cross border
basis (balancing the need to preserve fair competition and the need to achieve
financial stability). However, actions by the public authorities (whether supervi-
sion, regulation or resolution) cannot succeed unless they are accompanied by
better risk management and corporate governance by the financial institutions
that are supervised and regulated. Furthermore, European initiatives need to be
aligned with international efforts, since most pan-European banks are also global
banks.
Our proposal is a modest step in the direction of better cross-border crisis man-
agement arrangements to prevent and contain the effects of possible future finan-
cial crises.
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Picture 1: The Run on Northern Rock in September 2008
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11. JOINT SUERF, CEPS AND BELGIAN FINANCIAL 
FORUM CONFERENCE ON CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
AT CROSS-ROADS
Closing Speech by Governor Quaden
Brussels, November 16, 2009
More than two years after the US subprime crisis triggered world-wide financial
turbulence and one year after the collapse of Lehman Brothers exacerbated the
crisis dramatically, the title of this conference rightly suggests that crisis manage-
ment is at a crossroads. Indeed, the exceptional measures taken by central banks
and governments do appear to be achieving their objectives. It seems now that the
most severe financial crisis since the 1930s, which provoked a free fall in world
trade and industrial production over two quarters, will not develop into another
Great Depression, even if its toll in terms of subdued economic activity and higher
unemployment is not yet over. Crisis prevention will soon have to take over from
crisis management. This will require both a timely exit from the exceptional
measures taken to stabilise the financial system and the economy, and the imple-
mentation of fundamental reforms to remedy the structural defects exposed by
the crisis.
11.1. TIMELY EXIT
Let me turn firstly to the issue of a timely exit. The policy reaction to the financial
crisis was very decisive. Central banks were the first to react in August 2007, by
providing ample liquidity. After the sudden aggravation of the crisis in September
2008, they reduced interest rates to unprecedentedly low levels and took some
non-conventional measures to support bank lending and the financial markets.
Governments rescued systemically important financial institutions, through cap-
ital injections and asset purchases, and supported bank funding, through guaran-
tees. They also launched fiscal stimulus packages. In order to consolidate the
recovery, to avoid nurturing the seeds of future crises and to promote sustainable
development, these short-term measures have to be unwound at the right time
and pace.
The effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on the confidence in its sustainability,
and it is important to avoid the private debt crisis being followed by a public debt
crisis. The burden of fiscal consolidation should not be passed on to the next
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generations. Credible fiscal consolidation programmes have to be set up, and the
current outlook should allow the first steps to be taken next year.
But let me focus on the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. Too early an exit from the
current very accommodative monetary policy stance would entail the risk of a
relapse: renewed negative interactions between financial sector problems and the
real economy, along with a possible threat of deflation. Too late an exit would
sow the seeds for new financial excesses, with a risk of inflation. Obviously, the
assessment of risks to medium-term price stability must remain the fundamental
criterion. Moreover, I expect gradualism to be a key feature of the exit. Certainly,
our toolkit would allow us to react swiftly to any abrupt change in inflation
expectations. However, economic and financial conditions are likely to gradually
return to normal and, consequently, the upward shift in the balance of risks to
price stability will probably be gradual. In fact, gradualism is most appropriate
in uncertain times as it dampens the risk of disruptions in financial markets. The
sequencing of the exit is not pre-defined, nor is its end point, and will depend on
developments in financial markets and in the real economy. For example, the
Governing Council of the ECB could change interest rates while keeping some
non-standard monetary policy measures in place, if required by a dysfunctioning
of the money market – and you may remember that this kind of separation of
monetary and liquidity management measures was quite common in the first
phase of the crisis, from August 2007 to September 2008. Conversely, and this is
may be more obvious, some non-standard monetary policy measures are likely to
be withdrawn before raising interest rates.
So, where do we stand now? Even though they are not yet back up to their pre-
crisis levels, most financial market indicators have improved considerably. Since
the spring of this year, there have been signs of a nascent recovery, the ‘green
shoots’, mainly thanks to the policy reactions around the world and especially to
a rebound in Asia. However, the economic recovery is still fragile and reliant, in
no small measures, on expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Moreover,
commercial banks still have to repair their balance sheets and reinforce their cap-
ital base. The current slack in the economy is dampening price developments, an
assessment which is confirmed by the monetary analysis. Consequently, the Gov-
erning Council believes that current interest rates remain appropriate.
At the same time, the situation is not quite as dire as it was a few months ago,
especially in terms of financial market functioning. Therefore, the first steps of a
gradual phasing-out of non-standard measures can be envisaged, like a discontin-
uation of 1-year refinancing operations or a lower frequency for 3-month and 6-
month refinancing operations. They should not be seen as the start of a tightening
cycle, but rather as an incentive for banks to restructure their portfolios and to
SUERF2010.book  Page 108  Monday, March 22, 2010  3:04 PMJOINT SUERF, CEPS AND BELGIAN FINANCIAL FORUM CONFERENCE 109
larcier
resume their market-based funding activities, as a long period of cocooning in the
banking sector has microeconomic drawbacks too.
Looking further ahead, the Governing Council will continue to set the monetary
policy stance by assessing the appropriateness of monetary and financial condi-
tions in view of the risks to price stability. One of the lessons of this crisis is that
central bankers should not be guided by excessively narrow inflation targeting
but should pay attention to the build-up of financial imbalances, which may not
immediately exert pressure on prices, but an abrupt correction of which may put
price stability at risk. The Governing Council can claim that the medium-term
orientation of its strategy and its monetary analysis are assets in this respect. A
few years ago, at a previous SUERF conference, I announced that M3 might aban-
don us. And indeed, the long-run relationship between M3 and prices proved to
show signs of instability. At the same time, I pointed out that monetary analysis
was much richer than monitoring M3 only. We now monitor credit developments
closely. Research at the BIS, the IMF and within the Eurosystem is exploring the
leading indicator properties of money and credit aggregates which may be useful
in the identification of detrimental asset price bubbles. Further research is still
needed in order to reach definite conclusions. While monetary policy should play
a role in ‘leaning against the wind’ of over-optimism in financial markets, it
should however not be over-burdened. Interest rate policy on its own cannot
guarantee both price stability and financial stability, and should therefore be
backed up by prudential policies.
11.2. FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS
This leads me to the second issue, the fundamental reforms which are badly
needed. There is a long list of work in the pipeline of international fora. The
Financial Stability Board at G20 level as well as Ecofin at EU level have drawn up
detailed roadmaps to pave the way for extensive reforms. They cover new super-
visory arrangements at international level, enhanced frameworks for crisis pre-
vention, management and resolution, strengthened regulatory requirements,
revised accounting standards, promotion of integrity in financial markets and
even further-reaching regulation to cover previously unregulated instruments,
institutions or markets.
The authorities must be determined in their drive for better regulation and super-
vision. As explicitly noted by the Basel Committee, “the banking sector entered
the crisis with an insufficient level and quality of capital, inadequate provisions,
imprudent valuations, insufficient liquidity buffers, compensation polices that
encouraged excessive leverage and risk taking and excessive concentration of
exposures among major financial institutions”. The insistence on the words
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‘insufficient’, ‘inadequate’ and ‘excessive’ shows that more and better buffers are
expected.
The crisis has given rise to a unique momentum for profound reform of the finan-
cial sector. We should not let this momentum slip away. I know full well that the
return to more simplicity will be anything but simple. Of course, I realise that a
lot of technical issues have still to be resolved. And I admit that it will be impor-
tant to introduce the new regulations in a timely manner so as not to repress the
smooth flow of credit which will be required to support the nascent recovery. In
fact, while there is much discussion at the moment on the design of the exit strat-
egy from the public support measures, we should be equally aware of the need for
an entry strategy for moving over to more comprehensive regulatory require-
ments.
But all these considerations should not be an excuse for prevarication and delay-
ing the essential decisions to take for the design of a more comprehensive frame-
work.
The crisis has seriously dented belief in the ability of the markets to regulate them-
selves. While it would be illusory to dispense with the assistance of the market in
designing new supervisory and regulatory arrangements, these market consulta-
tions have more often that not been used by many financial institutions as a chan-
nel to lobby for softer regulation, certainly in the past and probably still today.
The rapid spread of the financial crisis has also served as a lesson for supervisors.
It has shown that the root of the problems was not linked to any specific difficul-
ties faced by individual institutions but, rather, to the gradual build-up of com-
mon risks within the system. It is now widely acknowledged that such crystalli-
sation of risk, linked to major shifts in the correlation between financial products
and markets, requires more systemically-focused oversight and regulation. To use
the professional jargon, micro-prudential control, the preserve of the supervisory
authorities, must be complemented by macro-prudential oversight, resorting to
the expertise of central banks. To improve the symbiosis between these two
approaches, a growing number of countries are adopting the so-called ‘twin
peaks model’ where the central bank is in charge of the full range of prudential
supervision, in both its micro- and macro dimension, leaving the oversight of
market integrity and investor protection to a separate institution. Just a few
weeks ago, the Belgian authorities, too, decided to introduce this ‘twin peaks
model’ here as quickly and smoothly as possible.
Needless to say, I am well aware that the macrodimension does not stop at our
country’s frontiers, while the micro-supervision of cross-border groups also
requires close multinational coordination. So, I strongly support the recent pro-
posal to set up, at EU level, a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and Euro-
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pean System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), which are called on to cooperate
closely in order to bring more comprehensiveness and consistency to national and
international supervision.
Macro-prudential analysis must rely on rapid, direct and comprehensive access to
data on individual developments liable to affect global financial stability while,
in turn, this analysis must feed the micro-prudential control. It would be a pity if
our efforts to improve this flow of information in our respective countries were
to be impeded by hurdles at the international level.
Crisis management has been effective: banks have been rescued, the abrupt rise
in risk aversion has been countered and it seems that financial markets are return-
ing to normal and that the fall in trade and output has come to an end. For the
emergency measures not to nurture renewed financial excesses, they have to be
withdrawn in a timely and gradual way and, above all, backed up by structural
reforms. Better regulation and supervision are needed. Great haste in regulating
complex matters would probably not be wise, but the political resolve for reforms
should not lose momentum.
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It is a great honour for me to deliver the SUERF Annual Lecture this year, follow-
ing in the footsteps of such prestigious speakers.
Thankfully, this year has been a bit less eventful than the previous one. These
calmer times have allowed deeper reflections among policymakers and academics
about a number of fundamental issues, including the appropriate framework for
monetary policy.
A key question that has re-emerged is whether it is sufficient for central banks to
focus on price stability. Given that the current crisis took place against a back-
drop of subdued inflation and well anchored inflation expectations, the answer
appears to be ‘no’. And if price stability is not sufficient to ensure financial sta-
bility, it is not enough to deliver economic stability either.
This leads to another set of questions. Should central banks better integrate con-
cerns about financial imbalances into policy? At what point do credit growth and
asset price booms become excessive and warrant policy action? What additional
tools would help central banks in dealing with these developments? Would an
explicit financial stability mandate help, particularly in managing the political
economy pressures? These are open questions that will be hotly debated.
In light of the theme of this year’s conference, however, I would like to concen-
trate my remarks today on the broad range of responses that central banks have
implemented to deal with the current crisis. These have been referred to as uncon-
ventional monetary policy, and I have three points to make. First, I will outline
how unconventional policies can be viewed as a crisis management tool. Second,
I will argue that more attention should be given to the asset side of the central
bank balance sheet than the liability side in discussions of unconventional mone-
tary policies. I will question the importance of bank reserves and their relation-
ship to bank lending and inflation. Finally, I will highlight some key practical
challenges in implementing such policies, including exiting from them. One con-
clusion that follows from this discussion is that unconventional monetary policies
appear more suited for exceptional circumstances and are unlikely to represent
an additional set of tools that central banks can use more generally in their nor-
mal day-to-day conduct of policy.
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12.2. UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES AND CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT
Let me begin by defining unconventional monetary policies as the elevation of
liquidity management operations from a passive role in the background, under-
taken simply to ensure the attainment of the interest rate target in normal times,
to an active role, to influence broader financial conditions. Given this definition,
I would like to offer some thoughts on unconventional monetary policy from the
point of view of crisis management. In particular, I wish to highlight two perspec-
tives from which unconventional monetary policy, as a crisis management tool,
can be viewed. From the first perspective, such policies complement the central
bank’s role as lender of last resort; from the second, they become an extension of
monetary policy. Let me discuss each of these in turn.
Apart from conducting monetary policy, a vital responsibility of central banks is
to act as lender of last resort. The core objective of this function is to prevent, or
at least mitigate, financial instability through the provision of liquidity support
either to individual financial institutions or to financial markets.
Traditionally, the lender of last resort function is associated with acute institu-
tion-specific shortages of funding liquidity. By funding liquidity, I mean the ability
to raise cash or its equivalent in reasonably large quantities, either via asset sales
or by borrowing. Typically in such instances, an institution finds itself unable to
pay or roll over obligations. Given the institution-specific nature of the interven-
tion, such emergency liquidity assistance can generally be clearly separated from
setting the policy interest rate.
In other cases, the situation confronting the central bank is something that can be
termed a systemic shortage of both funding and market liquidity. By market
liquidity, I mean the ability to buy and sell assets in reasonably large quantities
and at short notice without significantly affecting their price. Here, the problem
involves a breakdown of key financial markets owing to a loss of confidence and
coordination failures among market participants. As starkly demonstrated by the
current crisis, markets, just like intermediaries, may be subject to ‘runs’. And
these runs are driven by fundamentally similar forces. The result is a sudden and
prolonged evaporation of both market and funding liquidity, with serious conse-
quences for the stability of both the financial system and the real economy.
From a financial stability perspective, unconventional monetary policy measures
can be seen as a lender of last resort response to this second type of crisis. The
underlying aim of intervention is to support market functioning by restoring both
funding and market liquidity and thereby to shore up confidence in the financial
system as a whole. Typically, this will require a broadening of the central bank’s
provision of liquidity, in terms of both accessibility and structure. From such a
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viewpoint, targeted interventions in specific market segments are primarily
geared to improving market functioning. And while they may exert a beneficial
influence on broader economic conditions, such an effect is not viewed as the
main objective.
Nonetheless, precisely because these actions typically affect overall financial con-
ditions, it can be difficult to distinguish them from the stance of monetary policy
per se. This leads me to the alternative perspective from which unconventional
monetary policy can be viewed: namely, as an extension of monetary policy that
can be used when interest rate policy alone may not achieve the desired policy
objective, perhaps because particular segments of the transmission mechanism
fail to work or because of the zero lower bound. Here, central bank operations
are aimed at directly affecting broader financial conditions, such as asset prices,
yields and funding conditions, over and above the impact of the policy rate.
While the lender of last resort and the monetary policy perspectives are usually
distinct from one another, with the former focused on financial stability and the
latter on macroeconomic stability, they can become closely intertwined in a crisis.
Ensuring continued market functioning as a lender of last resort generally entails
interventions that reduce liquidity premia on certain assets. To the extent that the
reduction in risk premia translates into easier funding conditions, this adds mon-
etary stimulus. Conversely, insofar as concerted monetary policy interventions to
lower risk spreads and ease funding conditions serve to bolster market confi-
dence, they may improve market functioning.
The current episode can be viewed from both perspectives. When the crisis first
erupted in August 2007, central bank interventions focused on maintaining
liquidity in key markets primarily by supplying central bank liquidity and govern-
ment securities more flexibly. In this phase, the lender of last resort perspective
was clearly dominant. It was reflected in the introduction of various emergency
liquidity facilities such as the Term Auction Facility by the Federal Reserve and
the Special Liquidity Scheme by the Bank of England.
As the crisis deepened following the failure of Lehman Brothers and spillovers to
the real economy intensified, the monetary policy perspective became more
important. Interventions were undertaken with the explicit aim of steering
broader financial conditions to support central banks’ macroeconomic goals.
Prominent examples are purchases of government bonds to lower benchmark
yields and purchases of mortgage-backed securities to lower mortgage rates.
The defining element that is common to both perspectives is that they involve
operations that result in substantial changes in central bank balance sheets – in
terms of size, composition and risk profile. On the asset side, the extension of
term funding to banks, the purchase of short-term claims on businesses and the
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purchase of mortgage and government bonds have been termed ‘credit easing’, to
highlight the intention to maintain the supply of private credit at reasonable cost.
On the liability side, ‘quantitative easing’ refers to policies that emphasise the
supply of bank reserves.
To begin with, let me note two important features of such ‘balance sheet policies’.
First, balance sheet policy is not that new or unconventional in its essence. The
most familiar form is foreign exchange intervention, whereby the central bank
seeks to influence the exchange rate separately from the policy rate. What makes
its use in the current crisis novel is the market segments targeted: for example, the
long end of the interbank market, long-term government bond yields, private
sector risk spreads and the like. The recognition that such interventions do not
represent something entirely new facilitates their assessment. Indeed, bearing in
mind the parallels with foreign exchange rate intervention helps to provide useful
clues about the efficacy and limitations of this broad approach to policy.
The second key feature of balance sheet policies is that they can be decoupled
from the level of policy rates. Technically, all that is needed is for the central bank
to neutralise the impact that any induced expansion of bank reserves might have
on the overnight interest rate.
Let me give an example. Suppose the central bank purchases an asset outright
from commercial banks. In the first instance, it pays for this by crediting banks’
deposits at the central bank. That is, it creates bank reserves. Now, if the rate of
remuneration that the central bank sets on bank reserves is below the market rate,
as is typically the case, their expansion will lead to downward pressure on over-
night interest rates. This follows because the opportunity cost of holding reserves
means that banks will try to lend them out in the interbank market, and in so
doing depress the overnight rate. Thus, one way of shielding the overnight rate
from the effects of asset purchases is for the central bank to conduct offsetting or
sterilising operations, so as to leave the amount of reserves unchanged. There are
many ways of doing this, including asset sales, repos, or the issuance of central
bank bills. And as clearly demonstrated by many Asian central banks, the scope
for this approach is quite large.
Alternatively, if the central bank does not wish to offset the expansion in reserves,
perhaps because of limitations in the availability of offsetting instruments, it can
still shield overnight rates by paying interest on reserves at the policy rate. This
eliminates the opportunity cost of holding reserves, making them, in effect, a
close substitute for other short-term liquid assets in banks’ portfolios. This is
essentially the approach that the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have
followed. Of course, the opportunity cost is also eliminated automatically even if
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reserves are not remunerated when the policy rate reaches or comes very close to
the zero lower bound.
Thus, so long as central banks have sufficient instruments, the size and structure
of their balance sheets can be managed separately from the policy rate. One impli-
cation of this ‘decoupling principle’ is that exiting from the current very low, or
zero, interest rate policies can, at least in principle, be done independently of
balance sheet policies. In practice, however, the distinction is unlikely to be as
clear cut, especially insofar as the impact on overall financial conditions is con-
cerned. I will return to these issues later. But before I do so, I would like to address
the effectiveness of unconventional policies and its relationship to the substantial
increases in bank reserves that have taken place.
12.3. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UNCONVENTIONAL 
POLICIES
In principle, the effects of balance sheet policy may be transmitted through two
main channels. The first is the ‘signalling channel’, whereby central bank actions
or their communication influence public expectations about some of the key fac-
tors that underpin the market valuation of an asset. These include expectations
regarding the future course of policy, inflation, the relative scarcity of different
assets or their risk and liquidity profiles. For example, the announcement that the
central bank is prepared to engage in operations involving illiquid assets may, by
itself, boost investor confidence in them, thereby reducing liquidity premia, stim-
ulating trading activity and improving market functioning.
The second channel of influence is commonly known as the ‘portfolio balance
channel’. Here, imperfect substitutability among assets leads to changes in rela-
tive yields when central bank operations alter the composition of private sector
portfolios. Insofar as shifts in private sector portfolios lead to stronger balance
sheets, greater collateral values and higher net worth, they may also help loosen
credit constraints, lower external finance premia, and hence boost credit growth.
For example, by purchasing risky private securities from banks in exchange for
risk-free claims on the public sector, the resultant improvement in the overall risk
profile of bank balance sheets may not only enhance their risk appetite but may
also increase investors’ willingness to lend to them.
The effectiveness of credit easing policies can be seen in credit spreads. Central
bank lending and purchases narrowed the spread of term bank funding over
expected monetary policy rates, and the spread of mortgage bond over govern-
ment bond yields. Whether the purchase of government bonds by central banks
has had a similarly sustained effect on government bond yields will be debated.
In the case of the largest programme of purchases in relation to the economy, that
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of the Bank of England, bond yields responded to surprises in the series of
announcements about the initiation and expansion of purchases.
Turning to the liability side, while the central bank has a number of choices in
how such operations are funded, a prominent one is to expand bank reserves.
Two aspects of the role of bank reserves deserve to be reconsidered. The first is
the relationship between reserves and bank lending; the second is the link
between reserves and inflation.
Starting with the former, discussions of balance sheet policies often presume a
close link between the expansion of reserves and credit creation. The implicit
premise is that excess bank reserves induce banks to make loans. Either bank
lending is constrained by insufficient access to reserves or more reserves can
somehow boost banks’ willingness to lend. An extreme version of this view is the
notion of a stable money multiplier.
In fact, bank lending is determined by banks’ willingness to grant loans, based on
perceived risk-return trade-offs, and by the demand for those loans. An expan-
sion of reserves over and above the level demanded for precautionary purposes,
and/or to satisfy any reserve requirement, need not give banks more resources to
expand lending. Financing the change on the asset side of the central bank bal-
ance sheet through reserves rather than some other short-term instrument like
central bank or Treasury bills only alters the composition of the liquid assets of
the banking system. As noted, the two are very close substitutes. As a result, the
impact of variations in this composition on bank behaviour may not be substan-
tial.
This can be seen another way. Recall that, in order to finance balance sheet policy
through an expansion of reserves, the central bank has to eliminate the opportu-
nity cost of holding them. In other words, it must either pay interest on reserves
at the positive overnight rate that it wishes to target, or the overnight rate must
fall to the deposit facility floor (or zero). In effect, the central bank has to make
bank reserves sufficiently attractive compared with other liquid assets. This
makes them almost perfect substitutes, in particular for other short-term govern-
ment paper. Reserves become just another type of liquid asset among many. And
because they earn the market return, reserves represent resources that are no
more idle than holdings of Treasury bills.
To be clear: this is not to say that central banks are powerless to influence bank
lending. If lending is held back by significant funding constraints – because banks
are unable to sell illiquid assets or to borrow – interventions that alleviate these
constraints will encourage lending. Thus, for example, if banks’ access to future
funding becomes highly uncertain, central bank operations that supply term
funding may allow banks to keep lending. Bank lending may also be encouraged
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by the financing of such operations with excess reserves or short-term paper that
satisfy a demand to hold larger precautionary liquid balances. But the underlying
mechanism involves supplying banks with a liquid asset at a time when the access
to funding is difficult or becomes uncertain. Reserves simply constitute one pos-
sible asset among others that can serve this purpose. Whether a bank holds liquid
assets in the form of, say, reserves, one-week Treasury bills or one-month central
bank bills will not make a material difference to its willingness and ability to lend.
Typically, the main constraint on credit creation, if the demand for credit is there,
is bank capital relative to regulatory minimum or market requirements.
What about the concern that large expansions in bank reserves will lead to infla-
tion  –  the second issue? No doubt more accommodative financial conditions
resulting from central bank lending and asset purchases, insofar as they stimulate
aggregate demand, can generate inflationary pressures. But the point I would like
to make here is that there is no additional inflationary effect coming from an
increase in reserves per se. When bank reserves are expanded as part of balance
sheet policies, they should be viewed as simply another form of liquid asset that
is comparable to short-term government paper. Thus funding balance sheet poli-
cies with reserves should be no more inflationary than, for instance, the issuance
of short-term central bank bills.
This also suggests that the justification for inflationary fears associated with the
notion of ‘debt monetisation’ needs to be qualified. Here, the concern is that
purchases of government debt and the associated expansion in bank reserves
would lead to inflation. In addressing this issue, it is essential to distinguish the
effects that operate through interest rate policy and those that operate through
the financing structure of government debt.
If excess reserves are remunerated at a below market rate, their injection would
push overnight rates down to the floor established by the remuneration rate (or
the deposit facility rate). This is tantamount to an easing of interest rate policy.
Any ensuing inflationary pressure can hence be largely attributed to the usual
expansion of aggregate demand that accompanies such a move.
In the case where the opportunity cost of reserves has been eliminated, such as by
paying interest at the policy rate, their expansion would not affect overnight
rates. To the extent that any additional impact on inflation existed, it would result
mainly from the effect on aggregate demand of the flatter yield curve that these
operations may induce. For example, if the central bank were to inject reserves
through the acquisition of long-term government bonds, the net impact on yields
and inflation would not be dissimilar to the rebalancing of government financing
from long to very short maturities. In fact, such an ‘operation twist’ can be
achieved by the fiscal authorities themselves through altered debt management.
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Ultimately, any inflationary concerns associated with monetisation should be
mainly attributed to the monetary authorities’ accommodating fiscal deficits by
refraining from raising rates. In other words, it is not so much the financing of
government spending per se – be it in the form of bank reserves or short-term
sovereign paper – that is inflationary, but its accommodation at inappropriately
low interest rates for too long a time. Critically, these two aspects are generally
lumped together in policy debates because the prevailing paradigm has failed to
distinguish changes in interest rate from changes in the amount of bank reserves
in the system. One is seen as the dual of the other: more reserves imply lower
interest rates. As I explained earlier, this is not the case. While both the central
bank’s balance sheet size and the level of reserves will reflect an accommodating
policy, neither serves as a summary measure of the stance of policy.
To recap, the focus in assessing the impact on bank lending and inflation should
be on how assets taken on by the central bank affect relative yields, and hence
aggregate demand, or how they affect market liquidity and access to credit. Bal-
ance sheet policies work primarily by changing the composition of private sector
balance sheets. Their impact will be greatest when the assets exchanged are
imperfect substitutes for each other. Invariably, in such an exchange, the central
bank will be providing the private sector with some form of highly liquid, low-
risk asset. Such liquid assets tend to be highly substitutable for one another, espe-
cially at very low interest rates. Therefore, the specific form chosen, as deter-
mined by the central bank’s method of funding, will generally be of much less
significance than the choice of asset that has been acquired.
12.4. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING BALANCE 
SHEET POLICY
Let me now move to my next point and highlight some important practical chal-
lenges that central banks face in implementing balance sheet policy.
The first challenge is calibrating and communicating the interventions effectively.
With little previous experience, with the relevant transmission channels unclear,
and in the absence of a shared framework to quantify the various effects, it is very
hard to judge the impact of these unconventional policies and hence determine
the appropriate amount of intervention. At the same time, central banks have to
tread a fine line between acting as a catalyst for private sector activity, on the one
hand, and substituting for it, on the other. Moreover, they have to be wary of
potential distortions to the level playing field between those receiving and those
not receiving the support. Finally, they need to take into account what is done in
other jurisdictions. Coordination with other central banks can enhance the effec-
tiveness of unconventional policy measures.
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Even when policy can be appropriately calibrated, its impact and effectiveness are
influenced heavily by how it is communicated. With liquidity management oper-
ations being used to affect monetary conditions directly, the official policy stance
is no longer summarised by the policy rate. The resulting multidimensionality of
policy carries with it the potential for diminished clarity of the policy signal.
Communicating the rationale, nature, magnitude and time dimension of uncon-
ventional policies can steer expectations effectively, can avoid central bank cred-
ibility problems and can mitigate financial market volatility. Indeed, central
banks have taken care to explain their unconventional policies, with very wel-
come results.
The second set of practical challenges lies in the effective management of the
central bank’s relationship with fiscal policy. Balance sheet policy has a large
potential overlap with fiscal policy. The clearest example is when central bank
purchases of long-term bonds aimed at lowering their yield are counterbalanced
by actions of the government’s debt management to lock in low yields by issuing
more long-term bonds. This hints at a broader point. In principle, almost any
balance sheet policy can be undertaken by the government. While the central
bank has a monopoly over interest rate policy, the same cannot be said with
respect to balance sheet policy.
Moreover, balance sheet policy exposes the central bank to financial risk. Should
substantial losses materialise, the central bank’s operational autonomy may be
threatened in the absence of an explicit or implicit understanding with the fiscal
authorities regarding how losses are dealt with. Up to a point, some of the finan-
cial risks can be managed, for example through the restriction of eligible collat-
eral and the use of conservative haircuts. In the end, however, financial risks are
part and parcel of balance sheet policy. Therefore, the real issue is how far insti-
tutional factors related to the treatment of losses may constrain the willingness
and ability of the central bank to engage in such policies.
In this context, perhaps the greatest challenge to sustained utilisation of such
policies is of a political economy nature. The more the central bank relies on
unconventional policies, the more frequently tricky questions are raised about
coordination, operational independence and the division of responsibilities. A
case can thus be made for the establishment of clear institutional guidelines to
resolve potential conflicts and to enhance clarity in areas where central bank
actions may have a large overlap with those of the fiscal authority, and thereby
to preserve the autonomy of monetary policy. These include accounting arrange-
ments, rules for the distribution of profits and losses, and also mandates for the
scope of actions.
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This brings me to the issue of exit strategies.
Since, as I argued earlier, interest rate and balance sheet policies can be decoupled
from each other, it is then possible, in principle, to delineate discussions of exit
strategies along two separate dimensions: the appropriate level of interest rates,
on the one hand, and the desired central bank balance sheet structure, on the
other. The former will most likely be dictated by traditional output-inflation con-
siderations; the latter will also be influenced by considerations about market
functioning and avoiding financial market stress. In practice, however, this sepa-
ration may not be so obvious. Since balance sheet policies exert an impact on
broader financial conditions, in terms of the overall macroeconomic implications
their withdrawal will not be easily distinguishable from a tightening of interest
rates. This is part of the broader communication challenges of exit to which I will
come back in a minute.
The main challenge is how to properly judge the timing and pace of the exit. This
concern is a familiar one, being largely the same as that which applies to interest
rate policy. One possibility is that exit occurs too early, hampering an incipient
recovery. However, historical experience suggests that the balance of risks is tilted
towards exiting too late and too slowly. Political economy pressures tend to go in
this direction. At the macro level, the concern is that such a delayed exit may risk
accommodating the build-up of a new set of financial imbalances or else lead to
inflationary pressures. At the micro level, it may weaken unnecessarily the ability
of markets to work effectively without official support and may distort the level
playing field.
I should also stress here that, while the principles of exiting from these policies
may be apparent, the actual path of exit could prove to be challenging and poten-
tially bumpy. For one, communicating exit can be extremely tricky; there may be
knife-edge market reactions to news of withdrawal. Moreover, because consider-
able uncertainty exists regarding the transmission channels of balance sheet pol-
icy, there is a risk that central bank actions will be misinterpreted. For example,
a technical liability management operation such as issuing central bank bills to
drain bank reserves may be misinterpreted as a tightening of monetary condi-
tions.
The number of potential pitfalls suggests that we should by no means take the
scenario of a smooth exit for granted, and here again efforts by central banks to
explain are constructive and welcome. No matter how much market conditions
have seemingly improved, it is not entirely clear to what extent those improve-
ments are based on the policies in place.
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12.5. CLOSING REMARKS
To conclude, central banks’ active management of the size and composition of
their balance sheets does represent an additional tool to help ease constraints
stemming from the zero lower bound and to manage crises. In the current one, it
has clearly helped to ease severe liquidity strains and support the rebound in a
number of key markets.
Notwithstanding these positive developments, this policy tool is best suited to
restoring market functioning and bringing about more accommodative financial
conditions. Under current circumstances, it is no substitute for the required fun-
damental restructuring of private sector balance sheets. In an environment of per-
vasive uncertainty regarding financial institutions’ balance sheets, central bank
actions for the most part only ease the problem, alleviating the symptoms rather
than addressing the underlying causes. That is not to say that they do not contrib-
ute to the balance sheet repair. Indeed, the improvements in asset prices and the
boost to bank profitability that have accompanied these policies have certainly
helped to shore up balance sheets. Despite this, they cannot replace the forceful
implementation of measures that address directly the fundamental weaknesses in
private sector balance sheets or the need for better business models.
More generally, sustained reliance on a highly accommodative policy stance with
respect to both interest rate and balance sheet policies risks creating a perception
that the central bank alone is responsible for generating economic recovery. This
could reduce the incentive for market participants and governments to take more
fundamental measures. Also, I do not believe that we fully understand what the
repercussions would be for asset prices, commodity prices and the global finan-
cial system as a whole if the world’s major central banks keep policy interest rates
very low for an extended period. If recent experience is any guide, we must pay
serious attention to the risks that may arise. This is especially so for countries that
are not suffering from some kind of economic headwinds, and some that are even
benefiting from terms-of-trade gains and resurgent capital inflows.
Finally, the question is whether balance sheet policies represent an additional set
of tools that can be used not just in crisis management but also in normal times.
My own feeling is that the formidable practical challenges and the intense politi-
cal pressure that inevitably accompany their use suggest that they should be
employed only in exceptional circumstances and be withdrawn as soon as eco-
nomic conditions permit. That said, it will be useful to reflect back and learn how
some of these tools can be better designed and deployed in the future. A related
question is how central bank operational frameworks should be designed to
embed market-stabilising features more systematically and to improve flexibility
in response to shocks. For instance, it may be the case that operational frame-
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works will retain their greater flexibility with regard to collateral requirements,
counterparty eligibility and maturity of operations.
We still have a lot to learn from the crisis. Forums such as this one are an essential
part of the learning process. It has been a pleasure for me to be here and I thank
you for your attention.
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